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This thesis examines the 1999 Kosovo conflict and subsequent NATO military 
intervention including implications for Greece.  Additional areas of study include:  a 
historical and social background of the Balkans; a revival of nationalist pursuits; and 
emerging regional stakeholder relationships. 
The methodology included literature review, stakeholder analysis, and results of a 
researcher-developed questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers.  Survey results 
(p<= .05) indicated that the Kosovo conflict likely:  disturbed many Greek citizens; 
increased refugee migration into Greece; raised cross-border crime; increased 
environmental contamination; and may not have improved overall combat readiness of 
Greek armed forces. 
Additional conclusions indicated the following:  post-Cold War international 
focus has shifted to a European perimeter, Balkan domain; threatening regional issues 
remain; and Greece’s strategic role is expanding as a geographic and political peace-
maker.  Unofficial recommendations include:  integrate Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Albania, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) into the EU to 
facilitate a common Balkan and European approach to long-term regional peace and 
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The Balkans have been characterized as an unstable region and longstanding 
source of many ethnic conflicts. The Kosovo crisis that led to NATO military 
intervention on 24 March 1999 was a result of ethnic tension between Orthodox Christian 
Serbs and Muslim Albanians. The result ensures conflict lessened the overall safety and 
security of South-Eastern Europe. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
on 10 June 1999 halted NATO operations, and the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) were established. Even with 
these large-scale interventions, Kosovo future remains problematic and a source of 
considerable international concern. This study examines the historical underpinnings of 
the Kosovo conflict, the relatively brief NATO military intervention, and implications for 
Greece. As part of this study, 35 Greek officers are surveyed on their perceptions 
concerning the topic. 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
The geographical scope of this thesis concerns the following Balkan countries: 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey (European part), Hungary, and Moldova, as 
well as countries created after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 including 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro). Kosovo as a 
Serbian province is also part of the Balkans. This study examines the Kosovo conflict in a 
regional context with particular emphasis on its genesis and progression, major 
stakeholders, the revival of nationalist pursuits, and the military intervention from NATO 
forces on March 1999. Of particular concern are implications for Greece, including 
emerging post-conflict perceptions and applicability towards Greek foreign policy. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
The end of the Cold War and the demise of communism, although a victory for 
democratic Europe, revived an array of old and new problems for the region known as the 
Balkans. Problems emerged in several major areas: changing political identities; 
economic development and transformation; and conflicting ethnic minorities. The 
1 
Kosovo conflict was the crossroads for much of this complexity and turbulence. This 
study identifies aspects of the relationships emerging from the Kosovo conflict among 
relevant regional stakeholders in South-Eastern Europe. It focuses on the Greek 
perspective, including possible post-conflict consequences and Greece’s central role in 
developing policies ensuring regional safety, security, and progress. 
Research questions examined:   
1. Primary Research Question 
• How did the Kosovo conflict affect the relationships among relevant 
regional stakeholders and what are the implications for Greece. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What were the critical factors leading up to the Kosovo conflict? 
• What were the actions of the international community to solve the Kosovo 
conflict? 
• Who are the major stakeholders emerging from the Kosovo conflict? 
• What is the post-conflict status in Kosovo (i.e., post June 1999) 
• What are possible post-conflict consequences to Greece, as perceived by 
Greek military officers, including foreign policy implications? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The method of analysis is based on archival research of relevant articles and 
documents, and a researcher-developed Questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers 
from three services attending the Naval Postgraduate School. Current government 
policies related to the Kosovo conflict’s regional stakeholders were also reviewed. 
Stakeholder Analysis was applied as a strategic tool including construction of a 
stakeholder map. The questionnaire contained open and Likert-scaled questions to 
analyze the responses of 35 participants, i.e., a purposive sample was used. Finally, 
conclusions and recommendations were developed based on the data. 
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized into the present chapter, Introduction, and six more 
chapters.  
Chapter II provides an overview of the Kosovo background. It briefly presents 
Kosovo history from the pre-historic age to the Ottoman Empire by discussing the origin 
of Kosovo’s inhabitant tribes, and major battles of Kosovo occupation. Relevant aspects 
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of World War I, World War II, and Kosovo’s status under Tito’s Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including disintegration, are briefly reviewed. The NATO military 
intervention in 1999 is described. 
Chapter III focuses on the international interventions and armed clashes by 
presenting the pro-Kosovo NATO military intervention, and the diplomatic efforts in 
Rambouillet and Paris.  The NATO military intervention ‘Allied Force’ as well as the 
NATO air strikes and the United Nations Security Council Peace Resolution 1244, 
signaling the end of the war are also discussed.  
Chapter IV outlines the present situation in Kosovo, i.e., operation under the 
auspices of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and 
Kosovo Force (KFOR). The chapter discusses the structure of these organizations, 
including their peace missions and administrative preparations to establish an 
autonomous government.  
Chapter V identifies Kosovo conflict stakeholders and describes Greece’s 
relations with the stakeholders in terms of foreign policy and security implications. After 
the definition of security in the Balkans is addressed, Greece’s relations are examined 
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). 
Chapter VI analyzes the data collected through a researcher-developed 
questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Their responses to Likert-scaled questions are analyzed using a Chi-Square goodness of 
Fit. Several open-ended questions were used to help explain some of the rationale behind 
their scaled-responses. 
Chapter VII provides conclusions generated from the study, and brief 
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II. KOSOVO BACKGROUND FACTORS 
A. BACKGROUND FACTORS 
Geographically, the Kosovo area occupies approximately 4203 square miles of 
the western region of the Balkan Peninsula. This location, composed mostly of high 
round mountains, has considerable military strategic value. It could be the center of 
military concentrations which could be used to exert control over the routes connecting 
Central Europe and the Adriatic Sea with the East Mediterranean Sea.  
Throughout history, this strategic value has been noticeable because of the crucial 
conflicts that took place among Christians and Ottomans in 1389 and 1448. A result of 
these ancient conflicts, the Ottoman Empire dominated the Balkan Peninsula (DCI, 
1998)1. Additionally, because of its strategic value during the two world wars, 
multinational military powers showed substantial military and political interest in the 
Kosovo area. Augmenting its military value, the mineral-rich subsoil and underdeveloped 
plains make the region economically important as well. The area contains a large 
population of approximately two million people, including relatively cheap manpower, 
which makes the area important to the global marketplace. The region has received 
approximately $2.1B in economic credits following the 1999 NATO air bombing 
campaign (The World Bank Group, 2001).2  
These factors make Kosovo historically, militarily, and economically relevant on 
both a regional and global level. 
B. FROM THE PRE-HISTORIC AGE TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
1. Origins of the Tribes 
The Illyrians, who spoke an Indo-European language, were likely the first known 
inhabitants of the area known today as Kosovo (Vickers, 1998).3 Among the Illyrians 
were the Pannonian and Dalmatian tribes who mixed with the Celtic and Thracian tribes. 
                                                 
1 Kosovo Intelligence Report, Office of DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, June 1998. Available on 
line, http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/kosovo/index.html. 
2 The World Bank Group. Yugoslavia Federal Republic of Serbia/ Montenegro. Available on line, 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/66d6f5004ed085ca852567d10011a8b8/491897f86aaa345f85256
ad2004f5dd1?OpenDocument. 
3 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 1. 
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Research has proven that there was commercial contact with the Hellenic world towards 
the end of the 7th BC. The territory was under Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, and 
Serbian rule (Malcom, 1999)4 The region was conquered by Alexander the Great 300 
years before Christ and became a part of the Roman province of Dardania in the 4th 
century AD (Jansen, 1999)5.    
Late in the 6th and in the beginning of the 7th centuries AD, the Slavs, moving 
south from the Carpathian Mountains, crossed the Danube and attacked and conquered 
the Romans. The Serbs were part of this Slavic population. By the middle of the 7th 
century AD, the Serbs were settling northern Albania. By the 11th century AD, part of 
what is now Albania and the region of present day Kosovo, was in Slavic hands.  The 
Slavs also found the Wallachians (Vlachs), Illyrians, Tracians, Dardanians and other 
settlers in the region. By that time, the Serbs were settled in a region north of Kosovo 
called Rashka. By the end of the 12th century AD, the Serbs moved south and settled the 
area of what is present day Kosovo (Vickers, 1998)6.  Also, the Serbian population 
became dominant in what is present day Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Under the influence of the Byzantine Empire, the Serbs were largely 
Christianized and became Eastern Orthodox.  Kosovo was repeatedly a point of dispute 
among the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Roman, and Byzantine leaders into the 12th AD century 
(DCI, 1998)7 
In 1166, the Nemanjic dynasty emerged in Serbia. From 1180 to 1190, Stefan 
Nemanja and from 1331 to 1355 Stefan Dusan, were two of the most important men to 
reign.  That era was the most powerful and glorious for the Serbians (Vickers, 1998).8  
The Albanians are first mentioned in historical records in 1403 when they were 
described as being soldiers in a Byzantine Army. Albanians claim to be ancient 
                                                 
4 Malcom Noel, Kosovo. A Short History, 40. New York. Harper Perennial, Harper Collins Publishers, 
1999. 
5 G. Richard Jansen. Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History, Colorado State 
University, 1999. 
6 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 6. 
7 Kosovo Intelligence Report. Office of DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, June 1998. Available on 
line, http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/kosovo/index.html. 
8 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 10. 
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Dardanians of the Illyrian people. Moreover, there is a historical debate about whether 
the Dardanians were Illyria or Thracian. On the other hand, Serbs claim that the Albanian 
population arrived in the Balkans in the 17th century AD.  For this reason, the historical 
discussion of ancient Illyria has become a political debate. (Savich, 2000)9. In 1504, the 
northern part of Albania became Roman Catholic. Thus, there was one more reason for 
the confrontation among the Serbs and Albanians (Vickers, 1998)10.  
2. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire 
The Nemanjic dynasty lasted 200 years. On June 28 1389, the Ottoman Turks in 
one of the greatest battles in history, defeated the Serbs. The Battle of Kosovo took place 
outside Pristina in Kosovo Polje which means the field of blackbirds in Serbian. (Savich, 
2000).11 This date dominates Serbian history. Serbian Prince Lazar then ruled Kosovo. 
On the night before the battle, Prince Lazar said: 
Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian birth, and who does not come to Kosovo 
Polje to do battle against the Turks, let him have neither a male nor a 
female offspring, Let him have no crop,…12 
The Serbs believe that because of this victorious battle of the Ottoman Turks that 
Turkish rule lasted for 500 years and forced them from Kosovo. By 1448, the Turks 
dominated the Balkan Peninsula. For the next five centuries, the entire region was under 
the Ottoman Empire. Before the invasion of the Ottoman Turks, the majority of 
Albanians and Serbs were still Christians. During Ottoman rule, the Empire was 
organized on the basis of religion. Muslims could obtain privileges and status. As a 
result, most of the people converted to Islam. As Carl Savich noted on the Albanian 
conversion to Islam, ‘Albanians were able to gain social, political, and economic 
dominance in Kosovo’ (Savic, 20000).13 
                                                 
9 Carl K. Savich, The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense, 2000, Available 
on line, http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm. 
10 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 5. 
11 Carl K. Savich, The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense, 2000. Available 
on line, http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm. 
12 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, St. Martin’s Press, New York, N.Y., 1993, p. 39. 
13 Carl K. Savich, The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense, 2000. Available 
on line, http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm. 
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Serbian lands were settled from Albanians through the process of Islamization. 
Under this process, the settling of lands achieved its greatest expansion. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church resisted conversion.  
In the late 17th century, Austria grew stronger in the north. The wars between 
Austria and the Ottoman Empire, in 1690 and 1737-39, resulted in large Serbian 
migrations. They moved northward towards Belgrade. These great migrations changed 
the ethnic balance in Kosovo. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Russians 
defeated the Ottomans. Following this event, the Albanian nationalist leaders called a 
meeting on June 10 1878 in Prizren. The 300 delegates founded what is known as “The 
Prizren League”. The main goal of this league was to unite all Albanians in the inhabited 
regions of the Balkans into a Greater Albania (Savich, 2000). Religion turned out to be 
the critical factor for status and position. The League of Prizren created a political 
agenda. The political goal was a united Albanian State. (Savich, 2000).14 Furthermore, 
this league was to defeat any Christian adversary considered to be on Albanian lands. 
This league was the precursor of the country of Albania. The League of Prizren was 
established one night before the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. According to that treaty, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent, and the principality of Bulgaria 
was created. Slovenia and Croatia stayed under the rule of Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
which also took control of Bosnia-Herzegovina but later (Kohl-Libal, 1997).15  
3. After the Decline of the Ottoman Empire 
By the beginning of the 20th century AD, the power of the Ottoman Empire was 
waning. The First Balkan War started on 8 October 1912. Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro 
and Greece fought against the Ottoman Empire. After the end of this war, on 30 May 
1913, the Balkan allies defeated the Ottoman Turks and Kosovo became a part of Serbia. 
After 500 years, Kosovo was again under Serbian sovereignty. After all those years, the 
population of Kosovo had changed and the largest ethnic group in Kosovo were the 
Muslims. (Savic, 2000)16.    
                                                 
14 Carl K. Savich, The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense, 2000. Available 
on line, http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm. 
15 Kohl Christine von, and Wolfgang Libal. Kosovo. The Gordian Knot of the Balkans. In Kosovo. In 
the Heart of the Powder Keg. Ed. Robert Elsie, 9-12, New York: Boulder-Columbia University Press, 1997. 
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16 Carl K. Savich, The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense, 2000. Available 
on line, http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm. 
The Second Balkan War started on 30 June 1913. Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, 
and the Ottoman Empire fought against Bulgaria. After the end of this war, on 13 August 
1913, Bulgaria was defeated. This time Serbia gained almost all of Macedonia while 
Bulgaria only gained a small portion (Vickers 1998)17. 
In 1914, the Austria-Hungary Emperor’s son and heir, Franz Ferdinand was 
assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serb nationalist. He wanted Slavs to be a barrier against 
Serbian expansionism. Thus, on 28 July 1914, war was declared between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia. This war led to World War I. During World War I, the opposing 
sides were, on the one hand, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia with Greece joining the 
Entente Powers of France, Great Britain, and Russia, and on the other hand, Bulgaria and 
the Ottoman Empire which joined sides with the Central Powers of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary was defeated in World War I.  On 1 December 1918, 
Kosovo became part of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”. The name of the 
state was changed to Yugoslavia by King Alexander in 1929 (Vickers, 1998)18. 
Yugoslavia consisted of Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia–Slavonia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The population of the Kingdom was 12 million people 
which constituted a Slavic state. Of them, 400,000 were Albanians. However, 64% of the 
population of Kosovo was Albanian. Atrocities took place between the Serbs and 
Albanians during this time. (Jansen, 1999).19  
Albania and Croatia were opposed to the Serb monarchy, and on 15 January 1939, 
declared Croatia’s independence from Belgrade. Also, Albanians, with Mussolini’s 
approval, opposed the Serbs until April 1939, when Mussolini’s 30,000 strong Italian 
army invaded Albania.  The Italian Army developed strong forces in Albania. 
In June 1940, Italy declared war on England and France. On 28 October 1940, 
Italy attacked Greece. Greek forces defeated the Italian Army and routed them back into 
Albania. After this loss, Italy asked for German assistance. During World War II, 
ria joined the Axis powers in 1941 and Yugoslavia joined Romania, Hungary, and Bulga                                                 
17 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 62-
855. 
18 Ibid. 
19 G. Richard Jansen. Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History. Colorado State 
University, 1999. 
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the Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan on 25 March 1941. Two days later, on 27 March 
1941, Yugoslavia reconsidered its statement and left the Pact. On 6 April 1941, the Axis 
forces invaded Yugoslavia. Croatia welcomed the Axis forces. Croatian Fascists, along 
with the Germans, killed thousands of Serbs. German forces occupied Serbia, Macedonia 
and Greece. Italian forces occupied Montenegro. Albanian forces occupied Kosovo. 
Yugoslavia resisted the German forces with two main leaders. One was General 
Mihailovic with his Loyalist Chetnicks and the other was the head of the Communist 
Party Josip Broz Tito with his Partisans (Jansen, 1999)20. These Partisans later became 
the dominant force in Yugoslavia.  
4. Serbia – Kosovo Identity and Development 
In November 1945, Tito established Yugoslavia as a Federal Republic. The 
Federation consisted of six equal republics. These republics were Serbia, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Kosovo was recognized as 
an autonomous region under the Federal Republic. Later in 1974, Tito gave Kosovo and 
Vojvodina, the two regions inside Serbia, autonomous status and considered them equal 
to the other republics. In Kosovo, there was an explosion of births among low income 
Albanians. Tito assisted Kosovo with a constant flow of money and yielded an aggressive 
campaign to reverse the educational deficiencies of the Kosovars. Tito’s decision to name 
Kosovo and Vojvodina as autonomous regions was strongly criticized by the Serbians. 
On 4 May 1980, Tito died. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had survived for 
ten years. Kosovar Albanians felt alone without any protection. From the mid 1980’s, the 
tension and polarization between Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs increased. Kosovo 
realized full autonomy in all areas in the period from 1974 until the late 1980’s. This 
autonomy did not satisfy the Kosovar Albanians. As Richard Jansen noticed, some 
wanted status as a republic within Yugoslavia, while others favored unification in a 
“Greater Albania” with Albania along with Albanians from Macedonia and Montenegro 
(Jansen, 1999)21. 
                                                 
20 G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History, Colorado State 
University, 1999. 
21 G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History, Colorado State 
University, 1999. 
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In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia. He did not like the 
autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. He began to support legislation that would 
ensure Serbian control over these provinces. These rules caused the exaltation of the 
Kosovar Albanians who represented 88 percent of the entire Kosovo population. 
Albanian students staged a series of violent protests in Pristina in 1981 in order to express 
their frustration with the new Milocevic regime. Ethnic Albanian students and numerous 
Serb policemen were killed during the violence (Washington Post, 1981)22.  
In 1989, deprived of their autonomy, the Albanians established an underground 
government in Kosovo. The Serbs tolerated the existence of this shadow state because of 
its invisibility. The president of this resistance was a university professor named Dr. 
Ibrahim Rugova. On 23 December 1989, he founded the League for a Democratic 
Kosovo (LDK) (Vickers, 1998).23 In 1990, Milosevic canceled the autonomy given to 
Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Serbia took executive control. Under the Serbian 
constitution, these provinces became a region in Serbia. During the following years of 
1991-93, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs were living completely separated from each 
other. The economy was in bad shape. By 1993, 400,000 Albanians had left Kosovo 
because of the bad economic situation (Jansen, 1999)24. The social and economic 
deterioration forced Albanians to shift from passive resistance and civil disobedience to 
the use of terrorism in open rebellion against Serbian rule. In February 1996, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) emerged. The KLA started an armed campaign for the 
independence of Kosovo with a series of bombing attacks on selected Serbian targets. In 
October 1996, the KLA claimed responsibility for killing a civilian and a Serb policeman 
(Kosovo Daily Report, 1997).25 In response to the KLA’s actions, the Serbian authorities 
started the systematic expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. 
                                                 
22 The Washington Post, article: Yugoslavs Take Emergency Steps In Face of Ethnic Disturbance, 3 
April 1981. 
23 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 249. 
24 G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History, Colorado State 
University, 1999. 
25 Kosovo Daily Report. 31 August 1997. Available on line, 
http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-01-21/ksv.html. 
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Serbian inflexibility, the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the 
communication barrier between the Serbs and Albanians weakened the chances for a 
peaceful future in Kosovo.  Figure 1 shows the Kosovo province. 
 
 






III. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN KOSOVO 1998-1999  
Albania’s communistic political system followed the trend of the dissolution of 
communism in East Europe and collapsed. This collapse started in 1989 and climaxed in 
March 1997 along with an economic recession. There were persistent disorders and a loss 
of normality. The situation deteriorated further when some civilian groups took arms 
from the military depots. After this event, the political authority passed to these armed 
civilians (Amnesty Report).26   
These circumstances also gave the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members the 
chance to remove a large number of military assets, such as guns, explosives, and 
grenades, from Albania’s army depots. The now militarily empowered KLA started to 
engage the Serbian authorities in a civil war for independence. At that time, the U.S. had 
advised the leader of the Sovereign for a Democratic Kosovo party, Ibrahim Rugova, that 
Kosovo should remain a part of Serbia. However, public opinion among the Kosovars 
was divided and merely against Rugova. Essentially, the people had to choose between 
Rugova’s non-violent and therefore political approach and the KLA’s radical approach. 
By that time, the situation in Kosovo was one of rising ethnic violence, suppression of 
democracy, breakdown of law and order, systematic human rights abuses by the ruling 
authorities, and a refusal by the Belgrade government to seek, or accept, a political 
solution. 
A. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN 1998-1999 
In February 1998, a civil war began between the KLA and the Serbian authorities. 
During the first six months of this civil war in Kosovo, various organizations such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC) and the 
United Nations (UN) as well as European countries on their own were searching for a 
peaceful diplomatic solution. A “Contact Group on Kosovo” was established by 
representatives from Germany, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S.. In 
March 1998, they decided that the presence of international observers in Kosovo would 
                                                 
26 Amnesty International 1998 Annual Report on Albania. Available on line, 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/eur11.htm. 
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lead to an improvement of the present status of Kosovo within Serbia, and would stop the 
killing of the Serbian population. 
NATO and the international community were ultimately prepared to use force to 
reach their peaceful solution for Kosovo and made this clear to President Milosevic. 
Experience had taught that diplomacy without the threat of force would be wasted on 
Milosevic. 
The first approach was a call to all parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis. The Yugoslav forces seriously considered the NATO warning of military aircraft 
demonstration flights, but it was the KLA that accelerated their own military action, 
ultimately resulting in a Serb counter-offensive in late summer which was conducted in 
an indiscriminate manner. During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and 
police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar 
Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes (NATO Website 2002).27  
In October 1998, diplomatic efforts started again. NATO ministers called on all 
parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis, while directing the Alliance’s military 
authorities to prepare options for the use of force, should it prove necessary (NATO 
website, 2002)28.  In addition, the North Atlantic Council authorized the activation orders 
for air strikes against Yugoslavia on 13 October by passing Resolution 1119.  This 
resolution expressed concerns about the excessive use of force by Serb security forces, 
and the humanitarian catastrophe (Resolution 1119 Website).29 Also, KLA and Serb 
authorities were asked to impose a cease-fire. This was a further attempt to convince 
President Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and to cooperate in bringing an 
end to the violence. 
On 27 October, Milosevic had complied with NATO’s demands for withdrawing 
the bulk of his military forces from Kosovo. Furthermore, he allowed 1800 UN observers 
into Kosovo, and finally agreed that NATO aircrafts were allowed to use the airspace 
                                                 
27 NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict In Kosovo. Available on line, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B. 
28 NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict In Kosovo. Available on line, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B. 
29 NATO Resolution 1119. Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980923a.htm. 
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over Serbia and Kosovo to carry out surveillance flights. In return, Milocevic demanded 
from NATO the lifting of their authorization to carry out air strikes against military 
objects in Serbia and Kosovo, which was rejected by NATO officials. NATO’s rejection 
of Milocevic’s demands was interpreted by the KLA that NATO was on their side 
(Jansen 1999)30. Once again, the violence flared up. This time, the Serbian authorities 
were in a fight against the ‘terrorists’ of the KLA. Large scale acts of violence as well as 
provocative acts were committed by both sides. Reports from Pristina in January 1999 
indicate that human rights abuses by both sides were documented. Killing and destruction 
could be witnessed at an horrific level (War Child)31. 
As a result of all this violence and crimes committed, the October agreement 
between NATO and President Milosevic became invalid (Jansen 1999).32 
1. The Rambouillet Peace Talks 
Based on the experiences from Bosnia in 1995, NATO had gained some 
experience in this area. Compared to the Bosnian conflict, NATO this time was more 
united and showed a greater readiness to intervene in the Kosovo conflict.  The next step, 
after the voided October 1998 agreement, took place in Rambouillet, France on 6 
February 1999. The Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia (France, Germany, Italy, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) came together in Rambouillet to 
discuss further steps of action in order to reach a solution about the Kosovo area (NATO 
Website 2002).33 
On 28 January 1999, NATO officially warned Serbian President Milosevic that it 
was ready to use military force immediately in order to achieve the desired outcome in 
the conflict. In addition, France and Britain announced that they were ready to send 
ground forces into Serbia and Kosovo to enforce a peace settlement. In Rambouillet, 
from 6 to 23 February 1999, the Western Allies, led by the United States, issued a two-
                                                 
30Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State 
University. Available on line, http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html. 
31 War Child Articles Bulletin 6. Available on line, http://www.warchild.org/news/bull6/kosovo.html. 
32 Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State 
University. Available on line, http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html. 
33 NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo. Available on line, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B. 
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week deadline, threatening air strikes, during which time both parties, (the Yugoslavians 
and the representatives of the major Albanian Kosovar groups that demanded 
independence) had to agree to the proposed settlement. This settlement, dictated by the 
West, required Yugoslavia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo, and the KLA to lay down 
their arms. In addition, NATO peacekeeping troops would enforce the agreement with a 
three-year period to settle the political future of Kosovo. Yugoslavia believed that within 
three years after the required referendum it would be forced to grant Kosovo complete 
independence, the stated goal of the KLA. Settlement actually required Yugoslavia to 
surrender many aspects of its national sovereignty to NATO. It is therefore not surprising 
that Yugoslavia was unwilling to sign the Rambouillet document. Neither side would 
agree and the bombing deadline was extended two weeks (Jancen, 1999).34 
2. Last Negotiations for Agreement 
The follow up conference was held in Paris two weeks later from 15 to 18 March 
1999. Initially both Kosovars and Serbs had serious concerns again about the agreement, 
but finally the Kosovars accepted the proposed plan, while the Serbs would not agree to 
it.  Since Milosevic was not willing to sign the peace agreement, on 22 March, President 
Clinton dispatched Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade for one last meeting 
with Milosevic. During these talks, Milosevic accused the United States of sitting on the 
Albanian side of the table (Weller 1999)35 His view was that the inevitable outcome of 
the three-year period to determine the fate of Kosovo would be the severing of Kosovo 
from Serbia which was an outcome he could not accept. Holbrooke asked him if he knew 
what his refusal to agree to the “Rambouillet Accord” meant. Milosevic replied, “You are 
going to bomb us”. Holbrooke said “that’s right”, and the bombing started on 24 March 
1999 (Jansen 1999)36. 
B. THE OPERATION “ALLIED FORCE” 
In his statement of 24 March 1999, the UN Secretary–General Kofi A. Annan 
reacted to NATO’s military actions against Yugoslavia. He deeply regretted that, in spite 
                                                 
34 Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State 
University. Available on line, http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html. 
35 Marc Weller. The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. Ambassador Holbrooke, Interview on ABC’s 
Nightline, March 24, 1999, p. 496 (1999). 
36Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State 
University. Available on line, http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html. 
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of all the efforts made by the international community, the Yugoslav authorities had 
persisted in their rejection of a political settlement, which would have halted the 
bloodshed in Kosovo and secured an equitable peace for the population there. “It is 
indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be 
legitimate in the pursuit of peace”. UN Secretary–General Kofi A. Annan made clear that 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter had been engaged to enforce the peace in 
Serbia and Kosovo and that NATO in this case only had responded to maintain 
international peace and security. Additionally he indicated that the UN Council should be 
involved in any decision to resort to the use of force (Weller, 1999)37 Based on the 
support of the UN officials and international law, NATO started military operations in 
Kosovo intended to end the ethnic cleansing and killing, and persuade Serbian forces to 
withdraw. 
The campaign was conducted with air power only. NATO forces chose to execute 
a predictable air campaign from a safe distance. The targets selected were intended to 
cause both tactical and strategic results. The overall number of combat sorties flown was 
38,000 with no Allied combat fatalities. In general, the campaign was designed to 
minimize friendly casualties and collateral damage. (NATO Website Air Campaign 
2002).38 
Initially, it was very important to defeat the Serb air defense network. Later, the 
main efforts were directed against tactical targets such as military vehicles, heavy 
weapons and military depots. Despite the high technology weapon systems in the 
campaign, some obstacles made the operations difficult. The poor weather conditions, 
some special characteristics of the area, and the preparedness and mobility of the Serbian 
forces were primary concerns in the campaign. Great effort was made to minimize 
civilian casualties. Thus, NATO’s targeting had to go through all the levels of military 
command, as well as the Alliance’s political level. There was, therefore, military 
justification and a minimization of civilian risk. Nevertheless, some unavoidable damage 
                                                 
37 Marc Weller. The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. Statement made by the UN Secretary-General on 
NATO Military Action against Yugoslavia, 24 March 1999, p. 498 (1999). 
38 NATO The Conduct of Air Campaign. Available on line, 
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occurred to civilian property. According to the Human Rights organization in 90 separate 
incidents, 500 Yugoslav civilians are known to have died (Human Rights Watch).39 
In his statement of 2 June 1999, two months after the beginning of the air strikes, 
General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, gave a statement on the 
operations. He said that Allied aircrafts could fly without any restriction, because they 
had targeted the integrated Serbian air defense systems. The critical Serbian control 
points as well as the petroleum productions and reserves had been destroyed. 
Furthermore he gave some numbers that designated the size of the of the air strikes 
capability. About 40 percent of the Serbian fuel stocks were gone, along with 30 percent 
of fuel storage capacity. Also substantial numbers of Serbian heavy equipment, aircrafts, 
surface-to-air missile sites, and ammunition storage sites had been destroyed (SACEUR 
General Clark).40 
NATO expected Yugoslavia to capitulate and sign the Rambouillet Agreement. 
Instead of surrendering, Yugoslavia stepped up its war with the KLA and close to a 
million Kosovars were driven out of Kosovo, mostly by the Serbs, but also, by the 
bombing itself.  Many of the homes were burned. The bombing lasted 77 days, and this 
period set the Yugoslavian economy back by at least a decade (Dobbs Washington Post 
1999).41 
NATO had an open investigation policy any time that there was some “mistaken 
bombing”, as in the case of the Chinese Embassy, by publicizing as much as possible 
about the details of the accidents. This policy was in contrast with Milocevic’s expression 
of information based on distortion and propaganda. Even though in a war it is generally 
unrealistic for all risks to be minimized,  this goal was seriously attempted. 
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1. The End of the Air Strikes 
NATO had made it clear the actions Milosevic was expected to accomplish in 
order for the bombing to stop. These actions were: 
• ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and 
paramilitary forces 
• agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence 
• agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced 
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid 
organizations42 
On 10 June 1999, after an air campaign lasting 77 days, NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana announced that he had instructed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, to temporarily suspend NATO’s air operations against Yugoslavia. 
This decision was taken after consultations with the North Atlantic Council and 
confirmation from General Clark that Yugoslavia had started to meet the above 
conditions (NATO website, 2002).43 
2. The Peace Resolution 
On 10 June, 1999 the UN Security Council passed a resolution (UNSCR 1244), 
with 14 in favor and none against with China abstaining, in which it welcomed 
Yugoslavia’s acceptance of a political solution to the Kosovo crisis by ending the 
violence and a rapid removal of all their forces from Kosovo. According to Resolution 
1244, the United Nations had to deploy international civil and security presences in 
Kosovo under their auspices. The Security Council authorized member states as well as 
other relevant international organizations to create a force for an international presence. 
This presence was to assure security, deter new violence, and demilitarize the KLA 
forces.  The next mission NATO had to undertake was to bring the refuges back home 
and to facilitate a sustainable peace. Thus, one of the main jobs the new international 
force had to accomplish was to secure the environment for return of the refugees. The 
entire responsibility for the formation of the new international force passed to the UN 
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Secretary General who selected a Special Representative to control its formation (NATO 
Website 2002)44. Figure 2 shows the Political and Security Organizations of Europe. 
 
 
Figure 2. Interlocking Political and Security Organizations of Europe (From 
Messervy-Whiting, Graham. 1997, WEU Operational Development. Joint Force 
Quarterly, Spring 1997). 
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IV.  KOSOVO AFTER  OPERATION “ALLIED FORCE” 
On June 9 1999, the commanders of NATO and Yugoslavia signed a Military 
Technical Agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, the Yugoslav Army and its 
police forces left Kosovo.  On the next day, June 10 1999, NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana postponed NATO’s air operations against Yugoslavia after confirmation 
from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark of the 
Yugoslav departure. The same day, June 10 1999, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1244.  
This resolution adopted two main provisions to facilitate a political solution to the 
crisis. These were the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). These two provisions operate under their 
leadership with specific tasks to restore normal life to Kosovo. They are partners in an 
international effort to restore Kosovo’s structure and make it a democratic society. 
UNMIK is establishing an interim civilian administration under which Kosovars could 
progressively enjoy substantial autonomy (UNMIK KOSOVO).45 KFOR is establishing 
and maintaining a secure environment, including public safety and order (NATO 
KFOR).46 
The 28 national forces that entered Kosovo and formed KFOR tried to control the 
situation by protecting the refugees that had to be moved, and securing the small areas for 
the Serb minority people. This multinational force included Russian forces. Under a 
special Agreement for Russian Participation, Russia agreed to participate in KFOR. 
Under the international law that UNMIK and KFOR enforce in the area, Kosovo 
is still to be a part of Serbia and the Yugoslavian Republic, but until this is accomplished, 
the pre-war states of Serbia and Yugoslavia cannot be restated. These international forces 
(UNMIK, KFOR) will designate the time for passing authority bases to the Yugoslav 
government. 
                                                 
45 UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATIONMISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK). Available 
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A. UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN 
KOSOVO (UNMIK)  
In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, 
the Secretary General established an interim civilian administration UNMIK, led by the 
UN, in order to obtain a future staged settlement for full autonomy in Kosovo. 
All the principle administrative functions such as law and order, health, mail, 
education and so forth are performed by UNMIK. 
1. UNMIK Mission 
The specific mission of UNMIK is derived from paragraph 11 of the Security 
Council Resolution 1244 and proposing the following: 
• Performance of basic civilian administrative functions  
• Promotion of the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo  
• Facilitation of a political process to determine Kosovo's future status  
• Coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief of all international 
agencies  
• Support of the reconstruction of key infrastructure 
• Maintenance of civil law and order  
• Promotion of human rights  
• Assurance of safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes in Kosovo (UNMIK KOSOVO)47 
The senior international civilian official in Kosovo is the UNSRSG, the United 
Nation Special Representative of the Secretary. The first was Dr. Bernard Kouchner from 
France until January 2001. The present representative of UNSRSG is Mr. Hans 
Haekkerup from Denmark. (UNMIK MISSION)48 
UNMIK has accepted the former war legislation in Kosovo which would happen 
in any case since it does not contradict the national acceptance of Human Rights or 
UNMIK’s formed rules. 
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2. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
Structure 
In order for UNMIK to execute its mandated mission, the appropriate structure 
had to be created.  Under the UNSRSG, there are four pillars and each has a specific area 
of responsibility. 
• Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United 
Nations 
• Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United 
Nations 
• Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
• Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the 
European Union (EU) (UNMIK MISSION)49 
In order to better execute the administrative tasks and coordinate the pillars’ 
functionality, UNMIK divided the Kosovo area into five Regional Administrators and 30 
Municipal Administrators. Pristina, Pek, Prizren, Gnilane and Kosovka-Mitrovitsa are the 
cities of the headquarters of each of the five Regional Administrators respectively. 
Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the UNMIK structure with the four 
pillars. 
 
Figure 3. UNMIK Structure, (From: UNMIK Available on line: 
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo9.htm). 
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3. UNMIK Police and Kosovo Police Service 
UNMIK created an international force called the UNMIK police. Total manpower 
strength is 3,600, which includes 1,100 special police for crowd control and other special 
duties as well as 200 border police. The special police include personnel from Pakistan 
(115), Jordan (240), and India (115). 
The functions that the UNMIK police offer are various and consist of police as 
well as non-police tasks. The police tasks are investigations, street patrols, public order, 
traffic control and policing borders. The non-police tasks include guarding banks, money 
transfers, security of humanitarian convoys, judicial personnel and VIP protection. 
The main concern of the UNMIK police is fighting organized crime. A broad 
intelligence structure has begun to be established. The cooperation of this organization 
with international police will bring the anticipated reduction in organized crime.     
The total number of UNMIK police is not sufficient to respond to all needs. The 
international police account for about 77 percent of the necessary strength which is well 
below the desired minimum level. Thus, the UNMIK police cooperate with KFOR in 
areas were there is a lack of personnel for implementing law enforcement. Many joint 
operations have been initiated between police and military officers. This cooperation 
benefits the UNMIK police because it uses personnel and resources from the military 
KFOR force. 
The UNMIK police created a sub-section responsible for the development of the 
force. This sub-section cooperated with the Kosovo Police Service School, a new school 
initiated and funded by OSCE, with an initial plan to train and deploy 2,000 police 
officers by January 2001. The officers that finish the Kosovo Police Service School are 
trained with UNMIK police officers for 19 weeks. These new officers will constitute the 
Kosovo Police Service and will be the future police of Kosovo (UNMIK).50 
4. Kosovo Protection Corps 
According to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, one of the conditions for the 
settlements implemented after the end of the war was for the Kosovo Liberation Army to 
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lay down its arms. This was very challenging to the UNMIK and KFOR, which were the 
international forces responsible for returning normal life to Kosovo. It was difficult to 
change the former soldiers to civilians. The potential and the energy of the demilitarized 
former KLA manpower had to be reassigned. 
Under a joint effort, UNMIK and KFOR leaders created a transformation plan for 
the conversion of former KLA members into current Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) 
members. KPC was the major organization that could take in the large number of KLA 
members. The Kosovo Protection Corps was established on a provisional basis on 20 
September 1999 as a beginning of the transformation plan to prevent soldiers from 
turning to crime. The members of this force were the former members of the KLA.  The 
KPC's mission was to provide an emergency response against any natural or man-made 
disasters and to assist in the reconstruction of Kosovo.  
The KPC was officially created in an inaugural ceremony on 21 January 2000. At 
this time, the KLA had met all the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 
1244. The number of active KPC members was 3,000 and there was also a support 
branch of 2,000.  UNMIK had the full authority of the KPC and KFOR maintained day-
to-day control (NATO KOSOVO PROTECTION FORCE).51 
B. KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR)  
Under the implementation of the Military Technical Agreement signed by NATO 
and Yugoslav commanders on 9 June 1999, stating that the Yugoslav army and police 
had to withdraw from Kosovo, and in accordance with the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, the North Atlantic Council authorized the deployment 
of a security force in Kosovo. The security force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 
through an operation named Joint Guardian. By 20 June, this force was fully established 
in Kosovo. This security force constituted the Kosovo Force (KFOR) (NATO KOSOVO 
HISTORY).52 
1. KFOR Mission 
In accordance with UNSCR 1244, the mission of KFOR is to: 
                                                 
51 Kosovo Protection Force, Available on line, 
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/kpc.html. 
52 NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, Available on line, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. 
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• Establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public 
safety and order 
• Monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the 
conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK Undertaking 
• Provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core 
civil functions until they are transferred to UNMIK (NATO KFOR 
OBJECTIVES)53 
Today, KFOR has more than 50,000 personnel. These individuals come from 28 
different NATO and non-NATO countries. They are well equipped and well trained. 
Therefore, they are a deterrent to any possible hostilities between NATO and Yugoslav 
forces. Furthermore, the force is ready to confront any such future hostility. 
KFOR tries hard to maintain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. In the 
beginning, the interethnic minorities crime rate was 50 per week. Now the rate is four per 
week, a number which indicates KFOR’s improvement in supplying security for 
minorities (NATO FACTS).54 However, in this area, cooperation with UNMIK must 
continue in order to improve the court and judicial system. 
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), KFOR’s 
presence has allowed a total of 900,000 people to return to Kosovo (NATO FACTS).55 
The close cooperation with UNMIK’s first pillar, the Police and Justice under the 
direct leadership of the United Nations, provides humanitarian assistance. Not one person 
lacked food or shelter during the intense Balkan winters. Also, 300,000 children returned 
to school (NATO REPORTS).56 
Although the main purpose of KFOR is to create a secure environment, this force 
contributes much to the functions of UNMIK because of its skills and manpower. Thus, 
the cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK becomes stronger and increases 
interdependence. KFOR’s participation in UNMIK’s responsibilities is evident in public 
                                                 
53 KFOR Objectives/Mission, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm. 
54 Kosovo Facts and Figures, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo-ff.htm. 
55 Kosovo Facts and Figures, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo-ff.htm. 
56 The Job is not Yet Done: Assessing Remaining Challenges, Available on line, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/assessin.htm. 
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works projects, construction, mine clearance and medical services for example. (NATO 
KFOR MISSION)57  
2. KFOR Structure 
KFOR consists of the Main Headquarters, the Rear Headquarters, five 
multinational brigades, the Multinational Specialized Unit and the Greek Force Support 
Brigade. Personnel include 50,000 men and women. Of them, nearly 40,000 troops from 
over 30 countries are deployed in Kosovo. There are 7,500 more that supply the rear 
support through contingents based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Albania and Greece (NATO KFOR STRUCTURE)58   
The Main Headquarters of KFOR is located in Pristina. Since 3 October 2001 the 
KFOR Commander has been Lt. Gen. Marcel Valentin (FR). KFOR HQ reports to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) - Naples, Italy 
(NATO KFOR HEADQUARTERS).59 The Rear Headquarters are located in Scopje, the 
capital city of FYROM. The Commander is Major General Gunnar Lange (DA, Army) 
(NATO KFOR HEADQUARTERS).60 
The five multinational brigades (MNB) are located in different cities in Kosovo. 
Specifically, the MNB Centre is located in Pristina. The Commander is Brigadier D J 
Rutherford – Jones UK Army (NATO MNB CENTRE). 61 The MNB North is located in 
Mitrovica and the Commander is Brigadier General Jerôme Millet FR, Army (NATO 
MNB NORTH).62 The MNB South is located in Prizren. The Commander is Brigadier 
General Alois M. Bach GE, Army (NATO MNB SOUTH).63 The MNB West is located 
in Pec. The Commander is Brigadier General Giovanni Di Federico IT, Army (NATO 
                                                 
57 KFOR Objectives/Mission, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm. 
58 KFOR Structure, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm. 
59 KFOR Headquarters Main, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq.htm. 
60 KFOR Headquarters Rear, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq_rear.htm. 
61 Multinational Brigade Centre, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_centre.htm. 
62 Multinational Brigade North, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_north.htm. 
63 Multinational Brigade South, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_south.htm. 
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MNB WEST).64 The MNB East is located in Urosevac. The Commander is Brigadier 
General William C. David US, Army (NATO MNB EAST).65 
Each of the brigades is in charge of a particular area of operations and their 
relationship of command is single chain. Therefore, the brigades are under the authority 
of Commander KFOR Lt. Gen. Marcel Valentin (FR). All brigades have the same 
objective of maintaining a secure environment in Kosovo (NATO KFOR STRUCTURE). 
66  
Furthermore, there is a Multinational Specialized Unit, which is a Military Police 
Force. It has military status with an overall police capability. The contributing nations are 
Italy, France and Estonia. The scope of this unit is to provide KFOR with the necessary 
expertise in personnel and tools for criminal investigations. The home base is the 
contributing countries and the Commander is Colonel IT Carabinieri Emanuele Garelli. 
There are also two Communication Zones in KFOR. They are subordinate 
commands of KFOR NATO and maintain the lines of communication (LOC). The 
Communications Zone West (Information) maintains LOC throughout Albania and along 
the Albania-Kosovo border. It is located in Durres, Albania. The Commander is Brigadier 
General Antonino Cecconi IT, Army (NATO COMMZ WEST).67 The Communication 
Zone South also coordinates movements and transportation needed for KFOR from the 
south. It is located in Thessaloniki, Greece. The Commander is Colonel Nikolaos Vitos 
GR, Army (NATO COMMZ SOUTH).68 
Russian participation was initiated under a special Agreement for Russian 
Participation.  The Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of Defense 
of the Russian Federation agreed to Russia’s participation in KFOR. Russia had to meet 
some specific principles. These principles were common mission/purpose, common rules 
of engagement, Unity of Command, Single Airspace Management, Single System of 
Ground Movement Control, Intelligence Sharing and Exchange, Coordinated Public 
                                                 
64 Multinational Brigade West, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_west.htm. 
65 Multinational Brigade East, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_east.htm. 
66 KFOR Structure, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm#macedonia. 
67 Communication Zone (West), Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_west.htm. 
68 Communication Zone (South), Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm. 
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Information Process, Single System to Coordinate National Logistics and KFOR Base 
Support, KFOR Freedom of Manoeuvre and Operation, and Command Structure. (NATO 
KFOR DOCUMENTS)69 Today, the Russian troops contribute to the Multinational 
Brigades MNB Centre, MNB North, MNB South, and MNB East (NATO 
STRUCTURE).70 The above agreement took place in Helsinki on 1 - 18 June 1999. It is 
thus known as the Helsinki Agreement (NATO KFOR DOCUMENTS)71 
3. Greek Contributions to KFOR 
Greece, by following the development of the Kosovo crisis, contributed to KFOR 
in many ways. First, after the Military Technical Agreement and UN Resolution 1244, 
the Greece Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense decided on 11 
June 1999 to participate in KFOR in Kosovo at a brigade level contingent named Greek 
Force Support Unit (GFSU) (NATO GFSU).72 
The GFSU consisted of the 34th Greek Motorized Infantry Brigade with a 
manpower strength of 1,676 personnel. On 15 June 1999, the Greek Motorized Infantry 
Brigade left Greece and moved northwest to meet the KFOR forces. On 25 August 1999, 
the Motorized Infantry Battalion joined the Multinational Brigade East (MNB-EAST) in 
Urosevac. The rest of the Greek Motorized Infantry Brigade with the headquarters moved 
and located in Kosovo Polje. On 6 September 1999, the Greek Force Support Unit 
(GFSU) had fully deployed under the KFOR force as the Force Support Brigade. 
The mission of the Greek Force Support Unit is to support the KFOR forces. 
Thus, the Greek Force Support Unit acts in all sectors of the five Multinational Brigades 
(MNB) (ΓΕΕΘΑ, 2000).73 
The tasks of the GFSU are as follows: 
• Monitor, verify and enforce as necessary the provisions of the Military 
Technical Agreement in order to secure a safe and secure environment 
                                                 
69 Agreed Principles for Russian Participation in the International Security Force (KFOR) for Kosovo, 
Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/helsinki_att1.htm.  
70 KFOR Structure, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm. 
71 Agreed Points in Russian Participation in KFOR, Available on line, 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/helsinki.htm. 
72 Greek Force Support Unit, Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/gfsu.htm. 
73 ΓΕΕΘΑ Τµήµα ενηµέρωσης τύπου ΕΛ∆ΥΚΟ. 
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• Establish and support the resumption of core civil functions 
• Provide combat support and combat service support throughout the KFOR 
area of operation in order to facilitate COMKFOR's mission 
• Assist in the movement and destruction of confiscated weapons, including 
EOD support 
• Assist UNMIK in the reestablishment of civil infrastructure 
• Provide response to traffic accidents and incidents 
• Provide convoy escorts as directed 
• Perform medical exams and evacuation of population of Kosovo 
• Provision of security on board passenger trains from Kosovo Polje to 
Zvecan and back 
• Provide administrative rides to KFOR by helicopters74 
Some of the most important assignments for the GFSU were traffic control, 
phalanx escort, medical support, transportation and small construction.  The Commander 
of the GFSU is Brigadier General Zoukas Ioannis. 
Second, Greece contributes to KFOR with Commander Colonel Nikolaos Vitos 
GR, Army and the rest of the necessary personnel for the COMM ZONE SOUTH. It is 
located in the Northern Greek town of Thesaloniki. 
Third, there are other contingents located in Thesaloniki and Volos, two of the 
main Greek ports. The mission of these contingents is to support KFOR. When KFOR 
was created, the main portion of the force moved to Kosovo through the ports of 
Thesaloniki and Volos. Today, the largest number of spare parts and materials for KFOR 
continues to pass through these ports. 
Finally, a large number of Greek Staff officers operate in KFOR’s Headquarters 
in Pristina (Kosovo), Scopje (FYROM), Durress (Albania) and Thesaloniki (Greece).75 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 shows the region of the Multinational Brigades, the location of 
COMMZ WEST (Durres) and the location of the COMMZ SOUTH (Thesaloniki) 
respectively. 
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Figure 4. Multinational Brigades (MNB) Boundaries and MCO’s. (From: Mine 









 Figure 5. Communication Zone West. (From: NATO KFOR COMMZ WEST. 














Figure 6. Communication Zone South. (From: NATO KFOR COMMZ SOUTH. 
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V. GREECE’S POST-KOSOVO CONFLICT FOREIGN POLICY 
A. STABILITY IN THE BALKANS 
The Balkans have been considered in recent history to be one of the unstable 
regions of Europe. In the past decade, political processes in the Balkans have been 
determined by factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created five 
different countries. These countries are Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro). The provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo are included 
in Serbia. See Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7. Former Yugoslav Republic. (From The New York Times. Available on 
line: (http://www.pixelpress.org/bosnia/context/balkans-political.GIF.html) 
 
The countries that are physically located in the Balkan region are Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 
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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey 
(European Part), Hungary and Moldova. See Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Balkans Regional Atlas. From the Central Intelligence Agency.  
Available on line: (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/balkan/regter.html) 
 
Even though these countries appear to form a unique region, they are regarded as 
separate. In these countries, there are numerous national minorities, which compound a 
typical separation between religions, cultures and political identities. See Table 1. 
 
36 
 Table 1. Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Southeastern Europe Military Balance. 
(From National Institute for Strategic Studies. London 1996) 
 
More specifically in Kosovo, the large ethnic minorities are Albanians, Croats, 
Serbs and Montenegrins (Mertus, 1999).76 As a general rule, the appearance of territorial 
claims by ethnic minorities in the region leads to conflicts. The Kosovo conflict in 1999 
was the last one with campaigns for territorial acquisitions, massive deportation and 
ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, this new geopolitical situation in the Balkans shows that 
the focus of international security is under way on the periphery of Europe (White Bible, 
2000)77.  
The Balkans have always been on the agenda of Greek foreign policy. The first 
meeting of Balkan cooperation took place in Athens in 1976 upon Greece’s initiative. 
                                                 
76 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. University of California Press, Ltd. 
London England 1999, p. 21. 
77Greek Ministry of Defense. Lefki Biblos. Ypourgio Ethikis Aminas, Athens 2000, p. 26.  
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(White Bible, 2000)78. Greece as a Balkan country has been affected by these latest 
evolutions.  The war in Kosovo especially had a major impact on Greece’s security. The 
security definition includes military considerations, protection of human rights, 
promotion of democratic reforms and free economic markets (MFA, 2000)79. 
Additionally, renewed unrest in the Balkans would have a direct affect on Greek security 
and mostly on its geopolitical position. This geopolitical position is confirmed by its 
physical position in the Balkan region that connects Europe, Asia and Africa. The 
importance of Greece’s position led NATO officials to choose the port city of 
Thesaloniki as the location for NATO’s KFOR Communication zone south (NATO, 
2002).80 Greece possesses social and political stability as well as economic development. 
Furthermore, it has the ability to contribute to the solution of regional problems by 
safeguarding its national interests. It is the only Balkan country which is a member of the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is also a 
member of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). Incorporation in these 
institutions enhance Greece’s role as a factor for stability in the Balkans.  On 11 
December 1999, the European Council in Helsinki confirmed that an efficient and 
credible enlargement process must be sustained for the stability and prosperity of the 
entire European continent (EC HELSINKI, 1999).81  Greece aligned with this new 
European Council approach for enlargement and its efforts are focused on controlling 
potential sources of conflict and creating the conditions for political and economic 
development in the Balkan region. Greece as a member of the European Union wants to 
share the values and objectives of this treaty with its neighboring Balkan countries. Such 
efforts can assist its neighbors in the preparation for integration in the European Union.  
In order for Greece to facilitate security, it works with its neighboring countries 
for regional stability by implementing its foreign policy. In terms of the Greek Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, Greece’s approach to Balkan stability is “A 
                                                 
78 Greek Ministry of Defense. Lefki Biblos. Ypourgio Ethikis Aminas, Athens 2000, p. 13. 
79 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm. 
80 Communication Zone (South), Available on line, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm. 
81 European Council Helsinki. Available on line, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/12_99/doc_99_16.htm. 
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Total Balkan Approach” (MFA, 2002)82. The essence of this approach is to collaborate 
with the other Balkan countries in order to achieve the desired outcome of stability and 
security. Traditionally, Balkan relations used to be confrontational because it was 
difficult to set goals and achieve a consensus. Today, the Greek approach has changed 
and a communication channel has been achieved between potential countries and 
organizations (stakeholders). Issues are framed in order for a transaction process to occur. 
Greece, in order to cope with the post-Kosovo Balkan environmental turbulence 
and force stability in the region, takes its neighboring countries into account. These major 
potential stakeholders for Greece’s foreign stability policy are the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Figure 9 
illustrates the list of major stakeholders related to Greece’s post-Kosovo conflict foreign 




FYROM E U 
NATO 
 
Greece’s post Kosovo 
foreign stability 
policy  in the Balkans
Figure 9. Major Stakeholders Map for Post-Kosovo Greek Foreign Policy. 
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82Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Total Balkan Approach. Available on line, 
http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/South East Europe/TotalBalkanApproach.stm. 
Greece implemented this approach because it seeks to provide a crucial link in the 
formulation of its stability policy and the actual mobilization of support for this policy. 
Namely, Greece is assessing the impact of countries or institutions on engaging, utilizing 
and sustaining support while minimizing or neutralizing political opposition. In order for 
Greece to implement its stability policy, its major stakeholders have been identified and 
the aim is to try to organize and mobilize efforts, define and identify opportunities, 
obstacles and strategies which can then be evaluated in terms of their impact and 
outcomes. The goal is the construction of a good “fit” between Greece’s implementation 
of a stability policy and the external environment of the Balkans. 
Greece, in order to implement successfully its foreign policy of stability in the 
Balkan region, supports the establishment of good relations among all Balkan countries.  
For that reason, Greece participates in international missions in the Former Yugoslavia 
such as the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) present in Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro and 
Kosovo) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the NATO-led Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina, the European Union Administration in Mostar 
(Herzegovina), the International Police Task Force (ITPF) in Bosnia, and the Western 
European Union Mostar Police Force WEU (Mostar Police Force) (MFA, 2002)83.  
Greece also participates in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. This organization 
began on 10 June 1999 in Cologne and its mission is to apply a comprehensive, long-term 
conflict prevention strategy in Southeastern Europe (STABILITY PACT, 2002)84.   
The following pages present Greece’s relations with the major stakeholders of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 




                                                 
83Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greece and the Balkans. Available on line, 
http://222.mrq.t4/ro43itn/gqlkqn_affairs.htm. 
84 Stability Pact. Available on line 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat_descr.cgi?prod_id=1806. 
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B. GREECE’S FOREIGN STABILITY POLICY FOR RELATIONS WITH 
MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS 
1. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Greece has traditionally had good relations with Yugoslavia and especially with 
the Serbs because of the same religion and the common fight against the Ottoman Empire 
and Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars. During World War II, the Serbs opposed the Axis 
powers as did Greece. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece had good 
relations with the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Greek government 
recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a country on 25 April 1996 (MFA, 
2002).85 This country consisted of two republics (Serbia, Montenegro) and two 
autonomous provinces (Kosovo, Vojvodina). The capital is Belgrade (Serbia). The type 
of government is a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and its constitution was initiated 
on 27 April 1992 (FRY, 2002).86  
Greece as a democratic country supports the internationally recognized principle 
of the inviolability of borders with full respect for the human rights of ethnic 
communities and the peaceful resolution of differences. For this reason, from the early 
stages of the Kosovo conflict, Greece supported an accepted solution by all parties with 
respect to international law and human rights as well as the rights of Kosovo minorities 
(Albanians, Serbs). Greece always believed in political dialogue. As a Balkan country 
and a member of both NATO and the EU, Greece decided not to participate in the 
operation “Allied Force” against Serbia on 24 May 1999. As Greek Prime Minister Mr. 
Kostas Simitis said in his political party’s new central committee on 29 March 1999, 
Greece did not believe that solutions to the Kosovo conflict could be found outside the 
political and diplomatic field. Also, the military operations could change the borders in 
the Balkan region which is against the internationally recognized principle of the 
inviolability of borders. Furthermore, more reasons for Greek non-participation in the 
military NATO campaign were the friendships between Greece and Serbia, the new war 
refugees and the economic consequences of the war. The results of the war would have 
                                                 
85 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Balkans. Available on line, http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm. 
86 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Introduction. Available on line, http://www.gov.yu/start.asp?je=E. 
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been the destruction of the Kosovo infrastructure, and moreover, the destabilization of the 
region. (GREEK EMBASSY USA, 1999).87 
During the conflict in Kosovo, Greece with Switzerland, the Russian Federation 
and Austria launched a humanitarian initiative called “Operation FOCUS” on 28 April 
1999. The purpose of this operation was to assist all victims of the crisis in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Greece contributed a large number of envoys and 
humanitarian officers to FRY to coordinate the distribution of supplies. The NATO 
Summit in Washington D.C. in April 1999 praised the Greek officer’s humanitarian 
efforts to bring humanitarian assistance to the most displaced Albanian population which 
was hiding in the mountains (MFA, 2002)88. After the end of the conflict in Kosovo, 
Greek participation in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) with a brigade as well as the constant 
humanitarian help and medical supplies to Serbia, played an influential role both in the 
humanitarian sector as well as in the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the future. 
Even though Greece did not participate in the NATO military campaign, it did not 
oppose NATO military intervention and allowed the port of Thessaloniki to be used for 
the passage of NATO troops and supplies to the peacekeeping force (FBIS, 1999)89. This 
occurred because even though Greece did not agree that war was the best solution instead 
of diplomacy, it sustained its ties to the organizations to which it belongs.  Greece is 
concerned with the secession claims of ethic Albanians in Kosovo and fully supports the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Greek armed forces were in a state of alert 
because of the crisis in Kosovo, though not from a fear of war, but mainly for the 
preparation of military camps to accommodate refugees from Kosovo (HR-NET, 2002).90 
Greece responded successively to all the humanitarian calls received.  Thus, Greece 
always tried to reach increased military readiness in its humanitarian assistance. 
                                                 
87 Embassy of Greece in USA. Press office. Available on line 
http://www.greekembassy.org/press/newsflash/1999/March/nflash0330.html. 
88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greece Now. Available on line, 
http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/SouthEastEurope/OperationFOCUS.stm. 
89 I Kathimerini (Greek Newspaper). Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Available on line, 
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS20149.pdf. 
90 Hellenic Resources Radio. Greece Preparing for Wave of Refugees from Kosovo. Available on line, 
http://www.hri.org/news/greek/eraen/1999/99-03-24.eraen.html. 
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In the September 2000 elections, Vojislav Kostunica defeated Yogoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic. As long as Milosevic was in power, there were objective limits to 
the development of a comprehensive policy toward the Balkans because of his strict 
political regime. The new Yugoslavian Presidential election pointed towards a new era 
for Yugoslavia. On 7 October 2000, the Greek Foreign Minister George Panandreou 
visited Belgrade as the first European Union minister to meet with President Kostunica. 
This visit was the initiation of a procedure for Yugoslavia to be converted into a member 
of the international community. (ERA, 2000)91 President Kostunica showed his 
appreciation to Greece for the help it offered to Yugoslavia and called for Greece’s 
support in the Yugoslavian effort to become once again a member of the European 
family. He noted that Greece as a Balkan country as well as a EU member was the only 
path to the external world for Yugoslavia. (ERA, 2000)92 On 21 October 2000, the 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic visited Greece. In the meantime, Greece 
sent 32 buses to Yugoslavia to be used as public transportation in the capital of Belgrade 
(ERA, 2000)93 On 16 January 2001, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica visited 
Greece. He had a meeting with the Greek President Costis Stefanopoulos, the Prime 
Minister Costas Simitis and other Greek politicians. Greek support for the Yugoslav 
economy during its transition period was also confirmed. In addition, Greece indicated 
that it was ready to help Yugoslavia rebuild its infrastructure. Both sides concluded that 
Greece and Yugoslavia faced a new period of relations focusing on economic 
cooperation. 
President Kostunica agreed to enhance Balkan cooperation and to do everything 
possible to deal with the problem caused by the depleted uranium ammunition used in 
military operations. (FRY FMFA, 2001)94.  On January 10 2001, the Council of Europe 
issued a report referring to the environmental impact of the war in Yugoslavia on 
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92 The Hellenic Radio (ERA) Available on line, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2000/00-10-
07.mpab.html#10. 
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Southeastern Europe. According to this report, the environmental damage caused by the 
war in Yugoslavia resulted from the use of depleted uranium, the consequences of the 
extensive use of aircraft, water and air contamination, direct damage to forests and soils, 
and finally the environmental effects of population displacement. According to official 
information, concerning the use of depleted uranium specifically, about 31,000 warheads 
were used which constituted a total load of ten tons of depleted uranium. It is difficult if 
not impossible to recover elements of depleted uranium from the environment or to 
neutralize them. The biological accumulation of uranium has an effect on the population 
in the affected areas and can lead to permanent health problems (COE, 2001).95    
Greece strengthened its geographical position and through traditional ties with the 
people of the Balkans sustained the efforts of Yugoslavia to overcome its crisis. On 17 
November 2000, Greece sent an emergency humanitarian shipment of food of 1,100 tons 
of chicken meat and four million eggs to Belgrade. As reconstruction and development 
assistance, Greece financial help to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia includes $15 
million out of the total of a $100 million loan from Greece to Yugoslavia. Greece has 
also secured $250 million to be distributed until 2005 to be used for traffic, 
communications, health and education (FRY EMBASSY, 2001).96 
A stable democratic Kosovo is the most important issue for stability in the 
Balkans. UNMIK and KFOR have contributed much to the restoration of Kosovo but the 
situation in Kosovo is far from settled and will require long-term efforts by the 
international community. The most intimidating challenge for UNMIK and KFOR is to 
maintain security in Kosovo. After the end of NATO air strikes, Yugoslav military forces 
returned to Kosovo. The return of Yugoslav military forces to Kosovo as well as the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) within Kosovo did not result in any violence under the 
auspices of UNMIK and KFOR. However, as the number of refugees returning to 
Kosovo increased, the Serb minority in Kosovo became the target of ethnic violence 
mostly from KLA members. The situation in Kosovo today remains worrisome. The 
economy is in disarray.  However, the task of building a strong and viable indigenous 
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economy, which would be linked to regional and European markets, is certainly a long-
term challenge. Furthermore, lawlessness and the lack of security persist in many places 
and there is still no trust between Serbian and Albanian communities. Despite the 
presence of KFOR troops there are still some areas in which public order has not yet been 
restored. As long as the international community does not encourage a stable political 
situation in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR will not likely be able to bring long-term peace 
to Kosovo.   
2. Albania 
The Albanian state was formally recognized on 30 May 1913 by the Treaty of 
London (Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy) but created its current 
borders in 1926. Albania followed the Soviet economic model after World War II. Its 
leadership was under the communist regime of Enver Hoxha (VICKERS, 1999).97 In 
1978, Albania decided to follow a more independent policy, because under its 
communistic regime, it had been isolated from the rest of the world for a long time. 
Ramiz Alia, Hoxha’s successor, initiated small reforms in 1985 (Chopani, 1997).98 
 Sali Berisha was elected in the 1992 elections to the Albanian Presidency. These 
elections saw the collapse of the one-party state in Albania and the first democratically 
elected regime to come to power.  President Berisha launched a courageous economic 
program to enhance the Albanian economy, which was in dire straits, based mainly on 
external loans. Simultaneously, Berisha announced that his party would not stop fighting 
until its great dream of uniting the Albania nation came true (VICKERS, 1999)99. This 
was the issue of Albanian unification. According to this issue, the idea of a “Greater 
Albania” was the redemption of the Albanian brethren living in Kosovo and in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (DANOPOULOS, 1997).100 The international 
community urged Berisha that any move towards changing the existing borders to create 
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a unified Albania would cause a bloodbath and Albania would lose all its foreign 
economic assistance (VICKERS, 1999).101 Thus, Albania even though it wanted to 
achieve the unification of all Albanians of the Balkan region, did not have the potential 
economic and military resources to do so.  In the last several years, the Albanian 
government has explicitly rejected the idea of a “Greater Albania” and has emphasized 
instead the need to make borders more open and porous.  
The relations between Greece and Albania have been uneasy throughout history 
and sometimes hostile. The center of the dispute is a piece of land the size of Delaware. 
This territory is located northwest of Epirus in the northern part of Greece and south of 
Tirana in the southern part of Albania. Albanians see it as the southern part of their 
country and Greeks refer to it as Northern Epirus (DANOPOULOS, 1997).102 Greece 
became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. After its independence, there 
were Orthodox and Greek speaking people living in the above area. This Greek minority 
suffered much during the communist regime of Enver Hoxha (1908-1985). During that 
time many Greeks were dispersed around Albania and forced to hide their identity and 
culture. Later in 1994, under Berisha’s leadership, five members of the Greek minority 
political party in Albania were accused of and sentenced for secessionist activities. The 
accused were released under international pressure in February 1995 by initiating a new 
era of diplomatic relations between Albania and Greece (DANOPOULOS, 1997).103  
The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically affected the political and economic 
system in Albania. In 1991, Greece started to receive an influx of both legal and illegal 
Albanian immigrants as a result of an economic crisis in Albania. Since then, Albanian 
immigrants are estimated to be at least 250,000 in 1996 but according to other estimates, 
this number may have been as high as 500,000. (GREEK MOP, 2002)104 
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Greece pursues the development of good relations and cooperation with Albania. 
These relations are based on the respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, national 
independence and the respect of human rights including national minorities rights (MFA, 
2002).105 Good relations began on 21-22 March 1996. The Greek President Kostis 
Stephanopoulos visited Albania and the two countries signed an agreement of friendship 
and cooperation. The Greek president characterized the agreement as a “landmark in 
Greek-Albanian relations” (DANOPOULOS, 1997).106 At the beginning of 1997, 
Albania was plunged into chaos with the collapse of “pyramid” economic investment 
schemes. The ruling Democratic Party, under the leadership of President Sali Berisha, 
was widely blamed for this and the ensuing breakdown in law and order. The uprising led 
to the theft of approximately 600,000 firearms from the Albanian barracks by the 
Albanian people (ZHELYAZKOVA, 2000).107 Following this unrest, the United Nations 
Security Council issued Resolution 1101 on 28 March 1997 for the organization and 
deployment in Albania of a Multinational Force. Greece sent a Hellenic Force to Albania 
consisting of 803 men and 224 vehicles. On 16 April 1997, the Hellenic Force was 
deployed to the areas of Tirana, Avlon and Elbasan. The mission of this force was to 
secure the reception and distribution of humanitarian aid as well as to guarantee the 
smooth electoral procedures in Albania during 1997. The withdrawal of the Hellenic 
Force was completed on 3 August 1997. 205 men of the Hellenic Force remained in 
Albania in order to assist the Albanian forces in the reorganization and protection of the 
construction of the Military Hospital of Tirana built with Greek funds (MOP, 20002)108. 
Greece’s Armed Forces contribute to the Albanian Armed Forces with a 
cooperation project started in 1992. Since that time, many agreements have been signed 
during 1992-2002 for specific military matters related to military assistance, 
reconstruction, education, medical support and defense. Greece has donated $1.2 million 
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for the modernization of the Tirana military hospital. Greece has provided and still 
provides assistance to Albania in a variety of fields. The most important fields are: 
• Organization-Equipment-Training of two NATO structure Infantry 
Brigades at Avlona in Tirana some of which has been delivered, while the 
personnel meant to staff the Brigades are still being trained by the Greek 
Military stationed in Albania 
• Organization of a logistic support Base at Berati by providing means, 
material and know-how to assist in the organization of the base 
• The operation of Recruit Training Center by providing equipment and 
rebuilding the facilities of the camp at Mzes where the center will be 
located 
• The organization of the Naval base at Durres and St. Saranta by allocating 
means, equipment and know-how by experts of the Hellenic Navy 
• The refloating of sunken ships of the Albanian Navy at St. Saranta by 
providing equipment and personnel 
• The maintenance of the Albanian Beacon Network by installing lights, 
laying buoys and repairing beacons 
• The training of Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) which took place at 
appropriate facilities in Greece while material and equipment has been 
allocated for the U.D.T. of the Albanian Armed Forces 
• The reorganization of Rinas airport with material, means and know-how to 
be provided by the Air Force 
• The organization of the military hospital at Argirokastro by providing 
material and technical assistance. 
• The imparting of grants to Albanian military people to attend the Military 
Academies and NCOs Schools of Greece, such as the Military Academy, 
the Corps officers Military School and the Nursing officers Schools (HRI, 
1998)109  
Furthermore, after the Kosovo crisis, NATO in the framework of the Allied Plan 
“Allied Harbor” in Albania initiated the operation “Albanian Force”. The deployed force 
was 5,700 troops from countries that belong to the Partnership For Peace (PFP) NATO 
program. The mission of the Albanian Force (AFOR), from 16 April to 1 September 1999 
was to provide humanitarian assistance in support of, and in close cooperation with, the 
Albanian civil and military authorities, the United Nations and other non-governmental 
organizations in the field. On 8 April 1999, Greece contributed to AFOR with one 
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Infantry Company, one Engineers Company, one Supply and Transportation Company 
and one Chinook helicopter. The main task of the Greek Force participating in AFOR 
was the provision of water and the operation of the following three refugee camps: 
• Camp "ATHENA" in Kukes with 100 tents and the capacity to shelter 
1000 refugees. The camp was first opened and operated in the period 20-
28 April 1999 and then it was handed over to the Albanian Ministry of 
Defense where its supply from Greece continued until the end of May 
1999 
• Camp "OLYMPIA" in Tirana with 200 huts and the capacity to shelter 
2000 refugees. The camp was opened and operated in the period 20 April - 
14 July 1999 when it was handed over to the Albanian MOD. 
• Camp "VERGINA" in Pogradets with 200 tents and the capacity to shelter 
2000 refugees. The camp operated until 03 July 1999 when it was handed 
over to the Albanian MOD 
The Greek Force remained in Albania until 13 August 1999 and AFOR 
transformed it into one of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) communication zones (COMMZ 
WEST). From 1 September 1999 a part of the Greek Force belonged to AFOR and was 
transformed and contributed to COMMZ (WEST). The Greek contribution to COMMZ 
(WEST) consists of one Infantry Company with an Engineer’s complement of a total 
strength of 60 persons (MOD, 2002).110 
On 15 October 1997, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis visited Albania. 
The two governments signed an agreement for the opening of three new border crossings. 
The Greek Prime Minister stressed that his visit to Albania symbolized the two countries’ 
purpose to move ahead towards smooth relations. The Albanian press reported that the 
visit of the Greek Prime Minister was to promote bilateral cooperation (HR-NET, 
1997).111  On 12 March 1988, the Albanian President Rexhep Mejdani visited Greece for 
three days. During his visit, an agreement to protect the Greek-Albanian sea frontier was 
signed. Furthermore, a protocol for economic cooperation was signed in which Greece 
gave approximately $5.3 million (EURO 6 million) to the Albanian budget as well as 
approximately $48 million (EURO 56 million) in credit for developmental projects. In 
e presented Albania $208 million to finance a great number the period 1997 – 1999, Greec
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of infrastructures. These infrastructures involve electricity, the water supply, transport, 
education and health services. On 25 January 2002, the Albanian Prime Minister Ilir 
Meta visited Greece. In this meeting, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis mentioned 
that Greece supplied Albania with 100 megawatts during bad weather in the Balkans last 
December in 2001. They also agreed that meetings should be held to utilize the waters of 
Albanian AoosRiver (HR-NET, 2002).112  
In the past few years, thousands of Albanian patients have been treated in Greek 
hospitals free of charge. In the period 1990 – 1995, more than 40,000 Albanian patients 
had been treated in the Ioannina Hospital in northern Greece) (MOP, 20002)113 
Another major contribution to Albania’s economy is the Greek private sector’s 
investment in Albania. According to the Financial Times, telecommunications and 
banking have emerged as the main sectors of Greek investment but energy, food 
processing and retailing are also important. Hellenic Petroleum has started its network for 
oil products in Albania. The Greek Alpha Bank has also invested $15 million to launch 
its network in Albania (TIMES, 1999).114  
The approximately 300,000 legal or illegal Albanian immigrants who live in 
Greece sent a large amount of money back to Albania. The estimated remittances sent by 
immigrants to Albania amounted to more than $400 million per year (MFA, 2002).115 
The Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis noted that the issue of the Albanian 
immigrant’s social security coverage is still open for discussion. Furthermore, 
consultations are underway between the responsible authorities in Greece and Albania to 
find a better solution to the immigrant’s social security coverage (HR-NET, 2002).116 By 
the end of April 1999, after the beginning of NATO air strikes, about 600,000 residents 
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of Kosovo had become refugees. Another 400,000 were internally displaced in Kosovo. 
Albania received about 375,000 refugees and FYROM received about 200,000 refugees 
(MIGRATION NEWS, 1999).117 The EU governments wanted to keep refugees as close 
to Kosovo as possible because they believed that the further they were from their homes, 
the more difficult it would be for them to return to their country. Even though Greece 
aligned with the EU mandate on its refugee policy, it offered to shelter 6,000 refugees if 
necessary. Greece, by having experienced approximately 300,000 Albanian immigrants 
on its territory since 1990, was worried about the Kosovo refugee situation. All those 
thousands of ethnic Albanians that arrived in FYROM and Albania threatened the 
economy and political stability of these countries. Greece has faced the same problem for 
more than a decade with Albanian immigrants. Greece’s concern was primarily to 
prevent refugees from settling in the southern part of Albania where the Greek minority 
resides. For this reason, Greece took humanitarian action by sending humanitarian 
assistance to Albania’s capital of Tirana where the majority of the refugees had fled. 
Immigration, legal or illegal, plays a considerable role in the crisis in the Balkans.  
Immigration as a refugee flow impacts the host country. As discussed previously, Albania 
and FYROM hosted 375,000 and 200,000 refugees, respectively. In the case of Albania, 
the influx of refugees is an economic and social problem. The Kosovars Albanians 
refugees are the same religion and no ethnic differences exist among the Albanian 
citizens. As a result, the Albanian economy is strained, and the infrastructure networks 
and the social institutions are weak (USAID, 2002).118 Furthermore, the weak public and 
civil society institutions, fragile government authority, organized crime and corruption 
weakened them even more. In the case of FYROM, the Kosovar Albanian refugees who 
entered the country accounted for approximately 10 percent of the entire FYROM 
population. These refugees mixed with FYROM’s local Albanian residents that constitute 
approximately 23 percent of the population (COUNTRY WATCH, 2000)119. This large 
Albanian minority inside FYROM has led to a deterioration in Albanian inter-ethnic 
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relations with FYROM. Moreover, FYROM has to face the economic consequences of 
the large number of refugees that exceeds the country’s economic capacity. 
In the Balkan region, two routes seem to have replaced the former traditional 
route disrupted by the Yugoslavian conflict. One northern route runs mainly through 
Bulgaria, then Romania and Hungary and one southern route runs from Bulgaria through 
FYROM, the Kosovo region and Albania. 
It is difficult to predict the further development of Albanian organized crime. 
Future threats are realistic given the brutality and lack of ethics displayed by Albanian 
crime groups, the international links which already exist, the professionalism which 
characterizes most of their activities and the strong ties created by ethnic Albanian 
origins. Moreover, the strong position of Albanian crime groups in Kosovo, FYROM and 
Albania itself, is definitely a cause for concern in the international community, especially 
when the geo-political instability in the region and the presence of a UN peacekeeping 
force are taken into account.  
The other side of the immigration problem is its impacts on a wealthy neighboring 
country in which the immigrants are looking for a better future. This is actually the case 
of Albanian immigrants who come to Greece. These mostly illegal immigrants affected 
Greece’s economy and society. On 27 March 1998, Albanian President Redjep Meidani 
visited Greece. In his statement commenting on the issue of the increased crime rate in 
Greece that is being attributed to illegal Albanian immigrants, he noted that the problems 
of organized crime, smuggling and illegal immigration can be dealt with through 
cooperation between Greece and Albania (HR-NET, 2002).120 The groups which have 
invested capital in illegal immigration tend to view immigration in economic terms as 
principally an increase in the supply of low-wage workers in Greece. Albanian workers 
receive lower wages and often do not have social security which leads to lower 
production costs and has a positive effect on the competitiveness of Greek exports. 
On the other hand, the majority of Albanian families have been dependent on 
remittances for their survival. Remittances for the year 1991 have been estimated at USD 
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548.5 million and at USD 364 million for the year 1992. The Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, George Papandreou, on 23 May 2001, noted that over 20 percent of the GDP of 
Albania comes from these remittances (MOA, 2001)121. The Greek workers view 
immigration as a threat because in many cases the low salaries paid to Albanian 
immigrants have displaced Greek workers, especially in the industrial sector, construction 
and quarries. Furthermore, Greek public opinion concerning the Albanian immigrants is 
negative. Eighty five percent of the Greek population agreed that since Greece has 
reached its limits, there would be more problems if more immigrants arrived.  
(EUROBAROMETER, 1997).122  
Greece also has been affected by the flourishing of organized crime in drugs and 
arms trafficking in neighboring Albania. Drug trafficking, in particular, has developed at 
an alarming rate in the last ten years across the entire region of Russia, Central Asia, the 
Caucasus and the Balkans. Throughout Europe, around 40 percent of the heroin trade 
seems to be controlled by Albanians. Recent refugees from the Kosovo region are 
involved in street sales. Tensions between the established ethnic Albanians and new 
refugees seem to exist and heroin prices have dropped since their arrival which has 
resulted in growing competition in the market that caused prices to drop. Albanian 
cannabis is mainly sold on the Greek market. In order to transport the drugs to Greece, 
Albanian crime groups work together with Greek criminals. Albanian criminal groups 
also cooperate with the Italian Mafia and have links to the Middle East that allow them to 
import a large amount of narcotics into the Balkans (INTERPOL, 2000).123 
The Albanian Government has increased efforts toward the Greek minority in 
Albania. The Greek minority now stands as a bridge between the two countries.  The 
Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta in his last visit to Athens on 25 January 2002 noted 
Greece’s sensitivity regarding the ethnic Greek minority in southern Albania. He also 
noticed that good relations between Athens and Tirana demands satisfactory living 
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conditions and respect for the rights of the Greek Orthodox in Albania (HR-NET, 
2002)124 
Furthermore, Greece has been defined as the Leading Nation for association with 
international organizations in Albania which provides special prestige and importance to 
the effort made by Greece to assist in the restructuring of the Albanian Armed Forces, 
economy, and enhancing cooperation between the two countries. Greece is the only 
European Union (EU) country that has common borders with Albania. Greece’s goal is to 
continue to help Albania to be democratic, economically prosperous and politically 
stable. This will decrease Albanian nationalism, increase the rights of the Greek minority 
in Albania and finally will control the refugee flow across the borders. Therefore, Greece 
should keep helping Albania with its public and private sectors (MFA, 2002).125 
3. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
Since ancient times the land of Macedonia was between the states of Greece, 
Bulgaria and FYROM. Historically, Macedonia as a state existed only twice. The first 
time was during the reign of Philip II from 359 to 336 BC and his son, Alexander the 
Great, from 336 to 323 BC. The next time was 1991 when FYROM declared its 
separation from federal Yugoslavia (MERTUS, 1999).126  After the reign of the 
Macedonian Kings, Macedonia was under the rule of the Romans, the Byzantines, the 
Bulgarians, the Serbians, the Ottoman Empire and the state of Yugoslavia 
(TREADWAY, 1997)127.  In November 1945, Tito established Yugoslavia as a Federal 
Republic. The Federation consisted of six equal republics. These republics were Serbia, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. After Tito’s death 
on 4 May 1980, the Republic of Yugoslavia survived for ten more years. After 1991, in 
the former Yugoslav republics, the agenda of national self-determination has overridden 
the agenda of democratization, leading to the disintegration of the Republic of 
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Yugoslavia. On 17 September 1991, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its 
sovereignty (CIA, 2002).128 The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also declared its 
separation from the Yugoslav Republic and sought international recognition under the 
name “Republic of Macedonia”. The use of this name caused disputes with Greece 
because it had to be distinguished from the ancient Greek Macedonia and from the Greek 
province of Macedonia that is in today’s northern Greece. Furthermore, other disputes 
with Greece were the use of the star-burst symbol of Alexander the Great, the king of 
ancient Macedonia, in its flag as well as two articles in its constitution with hidden claims 
to the Greek province of Macedonia.  
On 16 December 1991, the Council of Ministers of the European Community 
with its Recognition of States Annex-2 adopted the Greek position to recognize the new 
state of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia if the three conditions about the name, the 
constitutional articles and the flag were settled. The last specific article was: 
The Community and its Member States also require a Yugoslav Republic 
to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political 
guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighbouring 
Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities 
versus a neighbouring Community State, including the use of a 
denomination which implies territorial claims (EUROPEAN JOURNAL, 
2002)129 
The Council of the European Community wanted to see improvements in the 
three conditions in order to recognize the new state of the Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. With an amendment to its constitution on 6 January 1992, the Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia made it clear that it has no any territorial claims towards any 
neighboring state and that the borders of the country can be changed only by generally 
accepted international norms (FOSIM, 2001)130. Greece was satisfied with this 
amendment but two more disputes had to be settled.  
                                                 
128 Central Intelligent Service. The World Fact Book. Available on line, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html. 
129 European Journal of International Law. Recognition of States Annex-2. Available on line, 
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art7.html. 
130 Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Available on line, http://www.soros.org.mk/mk/en/const.htm. 
55 
On 7 April 1993, the United Nations Security Council noting that differences had 
arisen over the name of the state, which had to be resolved, and without any mention of 
the flag symbols, welcomed with Resolution 817, the new state with the name of the 
“Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) (HR-NET, 2002).131 FYROM’s 
recognition came without resolving the disputes over the flag and the name. For that 
reason, Greece protested and on 16 February 1994, imposed an economic trade embargo 
and closed the port of Thesaloniki in northern Greece to FYROM’s imports and exports. 
This mainly occurred to force FYROM’s government to become less intransigent in the 
United Nations negotiations and to alert foreign governments, which were losing interest, 
that this was a vital but still unresolved issue (ZAHARIADIS, 1996)132. On 13 
September 1995, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias and the 
FYROM Minister of Foreign Affairs Stevo Crvenkovski, signed an Interim Accord 
between the Hellenic Republic and FYROM in New York in the presence of the Special 
Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Cyrus R. Vance. According to this 
accord, Greece had to recognize FYROM as an independent state, and the two countries 
had to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of each other as well as 
the inviolability of the borders. Greece had to establish a liaison office in Skopje, the 
capital of FYROM. Both countries had to continue negotiations under the auspices of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations in reaching an agreement on the differences 
described in Resolution 817 of the United Nations Security Council. FYROM had to stop 
using in any way the symbols of the star-burst in all its forms displayed on its national 
flag. The two countries shall refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of 
people or goods between their territories or through the territory of either country to the 
territory of the other. Both countries shall cooperate to facilitate such movements in 
accordance with international law and custom, hence the cessation of the Greek embargo 
(HR-NET, 2002).133 
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On 13 October 1995, Greek Ambassador Dimitrios Kypraios and FYROM 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Ljupco Arsovski signed a memorandum on the 
mutual establishment of liaison offices in Greece and FYROM respectively (HR-NET, 
2002).134 After these initiations, Greece and FYROM have entered a new phase in their 
relations characterized by the will of both sides to proceed to even closer and mutually 
beneficially relations. The Greek Government spokesman in February 2001 noted, “The 
climate between the two countries is very different compared with the past”(MFA, 
2002).135 The only dispute that has to be settled is the final name of FYROM.  
However, as the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgios Papandreou in an 
interview at BBC’s service noted, Greece and FYROM are viewing the issue of the name 
as friends and not as opponents. The two countries are trying to find a solution respecting 
both sides’ sensitivity and without any antagonism (MFA, 2002).136 
The economic relations of the two countries are impressive. As a small economy, 
FYROM recognizes that the country’s long-term prosperity is closely tied to international 
trade. Greece is FYROM’s second largest trading partner in the region and the third 
largest overall after the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Germany with $186 million 
total in trade during the first ten months of 1997 (CEEBIC, 2002).137 Greece also is 
ranked first in FYROM’s investment. Investment includes construction, banking, textiles, 
foodstuffs, electronics and telecommunications.  Tourism, particularly in the Aegean 
tourist resorts, is rapidly increasing. Also, military cooperation has been increased with 
the participation of FYROM units in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises in both 
countries. The Prime Ministers of the two countries met on 10 May 1999 informally in 
Thessaloniki Greece at a conference held by the Federation of Northern Greek Industries 
and focused on the situation in the Balkans a decade after the deregulation of markets. 
This meeting enhanced the economic and trade links of the two countries. On 29 
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september 1999, the Greek Olympic Airways initiated their flights from Athens to 
FYROM (MFA, 2002).138 
During the Kosovo crisis, Greece supported FYROM politically and 
economically. Greece undertook a serious effort to alleviate the burden placed on 
FYROM from the flow of refugees from Kosovo. The number of refugees that arrived in 
FYROM was about 250,000.  In April 1999, Greece approved $2 million in humanitarian 
assistance to FYROM. The total sum of Greek humanitarian aid for the refugees who 
flowed into Albania and FYROM exceeded $11 million. (MFA, 1999)139 In the energy 
sector, the Hellenic Petroleum Ltd. acquired 45 percent of FYROM’s OKTA refineries 
and has already began the construction of a 143 mile pipeline to carry crude oil from the 
port of Thessaloniki in Greece to Skopje in FYROM. The project will cost $90 million 
and will have an annual capacity of 2.5 million tons (MFA, 2002)140. Also, the other 
major Greek investment in FYROM was the acquisition of a 65 percent stake in 
Stopanska Banka AD, the largest commercial bank in FYROM for DM 117 million. 
FYROM has a population of more than two million people. The majority is 
Christian Slav-Macedonians but the Muslim Albanians account for 22 percent of the 
population (CIA, 1995)141. This Albanian minority in FYROM caused some trouble in 
2001. The conflict was centered on the ethnic Albanians and FYROM and their rights. 
Finally, on 13 August 2001, under a NATO initiative, an agreement was signed by both 
sides. On 26 August 2001, NATO began operation "Essential Harvest". The mission was 
to collect arms and ammunition voluntarily turned over by ethnic Albanian rebels, and 
thereby help to build confidence in the broader peace process suggested by the President 
of FYROM. Greece contributed to this operation with one infantry battle group. 
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According to this operation, Greece transferred and destroyed all the weapons collected 
from the Albanian rebels in two phases (NATO, 2001).142  
Greece and FYROM, despite the name dispute, have found ways in the guise of 
friendship and cooperation to find common ground. The constant Greek assistance and 
investment in FYROM as well as the different agreements between the two countries 
have introduced numerous bilateral contact areas. Greece is the link between FYROM 
and the European Organizations and can help FYROM follow the path of development, 
modernization and orientation towards the European Union. 
4. European Union (EU) 
The European Union was initiated in 1951 in the Treaty of Paris, which 
established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a joint of France and 
German coal and steel industries.  Later in 1957, in the Treaty of Rome, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
were established between the six European countries of Belgium, Italy, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Luxemburg and France, in order to create a common market and enhance 
relations between the partners. Finally, in 1992, the Treaty of Maastrict established the 
Treaty of European Union (EU), which created the political union amongst the member 
states with the main policy provisions of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Citizenship (US), and the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (VAN OUDENAREN, 2000).143 European 
integration is based on these four treaties. These treaties have been amended in particular 
when a new member joins the European Union. Today, the European Union consists of 
fifteen member states. The European Union through the treaties between the fifteen 
European countries extends its competence to the economy, industry, politics, citizens’ 
rights and foreign policy.  
The European countries that belong to the EU are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. On 1 January 1981, Greece became the 
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10th member of the European Community. Greece remains firmly committed to European 
integration. Greece’s economic rate increases and from 01 January 2002 is a full member 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) treaty and applied for euro zone entry and 
adoption of the common European currency, the ‘euro’, in accordance with Article 122 of 
the EU EMU Treaty (HR-NET, 2002)144. The ‘Euro’ has been used in all European 
countries as the common currency since the beginning of 2002. 
The Kosovo crisis was a challenge for the EU. The EU was present in Kosovo 
from the time the war ended on 10 June 1999 and Kosovo came under the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) according to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244. The EU has provided Kosovo and the Southeastern 
European region with considerable assistance. Therefore, the same day that the UN 
Security Council imposed Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, on 10 June 1999 under the EU 
initiative, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was adopted in Germany, Cologne. 
The partners of this Pact consist of more than 40 countries or organizations. This political 
declaration is trying to substitute the old reactive crisis intervention policy in 
Southeastern Europe with a comprehensive long-term conflict prevention strategy. 
Furthermore, the EU’s experiences and lessons learned from other international crisis 
settlements established the basis of the Stability Pact. The EU believes that conflict 
prevention and peace building can be successful in three areas which are the creation of a 
secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems and the promotion 
of economic and social well-being. Thus, the Stability Pact sustains its efforts to 
accommodate this three dimension process. (SPC, 2002).145 The structure of the Stability 
Pact is based on three Working Tables. Table one refers to Democratization and Human 
Rights, table two refers to Economic Reconstruction and table three refers to Security 
Issues. See Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. The Stability Pact Structure. (From: About the Stability Pact: 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/) 
 
The EU through the Stability Pact is trying to draw Southeastern Europe closer to 
the idea of full integration. Special agreements have been signed that will help the 
candidate countries to enhance efforts to achieve the prerequisites for integration. The 
intention is to increase economic, political and social cooperation between the EU and the 
countries of Southeastern Europe. For this reason, the EU will allocate EURO 4.65 
billion ($4.04 billion) during 2002-2006. Also, EURO 1.1 billion ($0.9 billion) was 
raised for projects in transportation, energy, telecommunications and supply (SPC, 
2002).146  Furthermore, EURO 378 million ($328.6 million) provided in emergency 
humanitarian assistance for the victims of the Kosovo crisis and EURO 127 million 
($110.49 million) for reconstruction programs started immediately after the war. 
Continued support to Kosovo from the EU came with the allocation of EURO 360 
million ($313.2 million) in 2000 and EURO 350 million ($304.5 million) (EUROPA, 
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2002).147 Table 2 shows the total EU economic assistance in EURO spent in Kosovo. 
Table 3 shows the reconstruction assistance implementation of the EU in Kosovo.  
 
EU support to Kosovo (in million of €) 1998  1999  2000  2001 
Reconstruction assistance 7.5  127   275  320.0 
Humanitarian aid   378(1)  50  12.5 
Financial assistance (macro-economic)     35  30.0 
TOTAL 7.5  505  360  362.5 
(1) This amount was provided for supporting the region affected by the Kosovo crisis (Albania, FYROM, 
and Montenegro). Out of the €378 million, €111.7 million were directly spent in Kosovo. 
 
Table 2. European Union Economic Assistance in EURO Spent in Kosovo. (From:  






Commitment Contracted Disbursement 
1998 /99 134.5 131.4  123.1  103.8 
2000 275.0 270.9 230.6 183.3 
2001 320.0 285.0 171.3 47.8 
 
Table 3. Reconstruction Assistance Implementation (as of 28 May 2001). (From:  
European Union, The Challenge of the EU’s Financial Contribution, Available on line: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see /fry/kosovo/index.htm) 
 
Greece is a member of the Stability Pact. Greece believes that the Stability Pact 
can be the momentum for a new agreement of the Balkans between the international 
community and Southeastern Europe. The isolation of the Balkans and the abuse of 
d by coordinated efforts of the Stability Pact in order to ethnic rights must be replace
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achieve cooperation, stability and regional integration within the Balkan region. Greece, 
with all that resources can provide, contributes to the Stability Pact in order to participate 
in the encouragement of economic development, cooperation, and respect of international 
law in Southeastern Europe. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, 
referring in his speech to the Balkan’s stability and improvement, noted that Greece’s 
northern port of Thessaloniki is already a commercial and cultural center. After Brussels 
and Warsaw, Thessaloniki in Greece also claims the establishment of the third campus of 
the College of Europe that is a unique and innovative postgraduate institute for European 
studies. Also, the regional office for the Stability Pact and the office of the European 
Unions Reconstruction Agency for Southeastern Europe are based in Thessaloniki, 
(MOF, 2002).148  
Greece ’s history and geographic location give it unique position to assist in the 
Europeanization of the Balkans and bring them into a common future of prosperity. As a 
fully integrated European state, Greece faces the challenges of globalization, 
technological changes, environmental degradation and organized crime. Greece’s entry in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) could contribute to the prosperity and security 
of Southeastern Europe. This can be realized by enhancing efforts for regional 
cooperation and reconstruction.  
Following the Colonge Summit, the Helsinki Summit of the European Council 
took place on 10 and 11 December 1999 in Finland. At this summit, the 15 EU members 
agreed that the European Common Foreign and Security Policy could be better achieved 
by improving the EU’s defense capabilities. Thus, the 15 countries certified a military 
‘headline goal’ for a 50,000 to 60,000 strong European crisis reaction force and 
ambitious capability targets. This force will be deployed in the next few years (WEU, 
2002).149 Greece should actively participate in the development of this military 
capability, and will assist in its foundation.  
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Greece with its involvement in the Balkan infrastructure, cooperation and defense 
plays a considerable role in bilateral relations as committed by the EU mandate in the 
region. For this reason, Greece continues to advocate greater EU attention to the Balkans 
as well as the necessary funding for the region in order for stability to be achieved. 
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
In March 1948, under the Brussels Treaty, the five Western European countries of 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed an 
agreement for a common defense system and to strengthen their ties in such a manner 
that would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats to their 
security. Since then, the NATO members today total 19 countries. On 4 April 1949, the 
North Atlantic Treaty was set up in Washington and consisted of 10 European and two 
North American independent nations (USA, CANADA) and they are committed to each 
other's defense. Greece joined in 1952. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined 
NATO in 1999. The NATO country members are Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all 
its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty 
and the principles of the United Nations Charter (NATO, 2002).150 The basic threat was 
the aggression by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, referred to as Russia. After the 
fall of the communist regime in 1989, and the division of the Soviet Union into its 
constituent republics, the Cold War with Russia ended. Western leaders began to think 
about what NATO’s role should now be. NATO changed its focus and became involved 
in European Other Than War Operations (OTWO) such as ‘peace-keeping’ activities in 
the Balkan countries. The Balkan region has always been a sensitive area. World War I 
started there and ethnic differences, religious differences and territorial claims make the 
Balkan countries particularly unstable.  
In response to Serbian aggression in Kosovo, NATO began air strikes under the 
operation ‘Allied Force’ against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 24 March 
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1999. NATO’s mission was to attack the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the 
objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars (VAN OUDENAREN, 
2000).151 
On 29 May 1999, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, speaking to the Greek 
government noted that Greece will not participate in any military operation in Kosovo 
(FLASH, 1999).152 Greece has historic and religious ties to Serbia, and sought a peaceful 
resolution to the Kosovo crisis that would preserve Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and 
protect Kosovar Albanian human rights. Greece has consistently said it is opposed to the 
NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia and has worked hard on the diplomatic front to seek 
a political settlement to the issue. Greece did not veto the NATO operation but it did not 
participate in the air operation because it is a neighboring country of both Albania and 
Yugoslavia and because it did not believe that military intervention would resolve the 
dispute. Furthermore, Greece allowed the port of Thessaloniki to be used for the passage 
of NATO troops and supplies to the peacekeeping force based in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. By doing this, Greece has successfully and without becoming 
internationally isolated, opposed the military operation. Following the above Greek Prime 
Minister speech to the Greek government, he added "Is there anyone in this chamber who 
thinks that Greece would be serving its interest or the interests of the region in cutting its 
ties with its partners and allies?" Furthermore Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis on 5 
April 1999 in a televised address to the Greek nation noted that Greece’s actions must be 
in cooperation with the other NATO countries and in contact with the Serbs. In any other 
case, Greece would have been alienated from all the involved parties. Greece’s interests 
are not to be marginalized in the Balkans. In such a position, Greece would become part 
of the problem and not a contributor to its solution. (FLASH, 1999).153  
Greece expressed serious reservations about the use of military force from the 
very start of the conflict. Greece was one of the first NATO allies to encourage an end to 
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air strikes and a return to political dialogue. Throughout the bombing campaign, it carried 
out efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis and promote a peaceful resolution through 
diplomacy. Greece believes that violence must not be used in dealing with Balkan 
problems that inflame ethnic interests. The most appropriate means to fight ethnic 
tensions are the mutual understanding and cooperation between the countries. 
Greece participated in NATO’s operation ‘Allied Harbor’ in Albania in 1997 in 
order to secure the reception and distribution of humanitarian aid as well as to guarantee 
the smooth electoral procedures in this country. Greece contributes its peacekeeping 
forces every time necessary to assist with humanitarian aid. In Kosovo, should a peace 
agreement be reached, Greece would contribute forces to peacekeeping efforts.  
According to a poll received in Greece on 30 April 1999, 96 percent of the Greek 
populace opposed NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia (GHMRC, 1999)154. Another 
poll conducted in Greece in May 1999 showed that 99.5 percent of Athens’s inhabitants 
and its district, accounting for approximately one half of the Greek population, believe 
there is no justification for NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, on 29 April 
1999, one Greek communist demonstration blocked a French military convoy from 
Thessaloniki to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
(PHILHELLENIC, 1999).155 Greek public opinion substantially affected NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia. Therefore, Greek public policy about NATO air strikes in 
Yugoslavia was in agreement with Greek mass public opinion. On this occasion, both 
opinions were in agreement.   
According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 
1999, the North Atlantic Council authorized the deployment of the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR). The Greek Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense, by 
following the development of the Kosovo crisis, decided on 11 June 1999, to participate 
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in KFOR in Kosovo at a brigade level contingent named the Greek Force Support Unit 
(GFSU) (NATO, 2002).156  
NATO today adopts a new strategy, reorganizes its command system and changes 
the structure of its forces. The two main ways that NATO contributes to stability in 
Europe is through the Euro Atlantic Partnership Counsil (EAPC) and the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP). EAPC is a multilateral forum where NATO member and partner countries 
discuss political and security issues and develop cooperation in a wide range of areas. PfP 
is the basis for practical security cooperation between NATO and individual Partner 
countries. Activities include defense planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil 
emergency operations (NATO, 2002).157 Furthermore in Berlin in 1996, NATO foreign 
ministers decided to build up the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The 
purpose of this organization within the Alliance was to enable the European Allies to 
make a more coherent and effective contribution to Alliance missions and activities, to 
reinforce the transatlantic partnership and to allow European Allies to act by themselves 
as required. Also, at the Brussels Summit of January 1994, the concept of a Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) was launched. This is a multinational, multi-service deployable 
task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations 
not involving the defense of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and 
peacekeeping. CJTF full implementation is estimated to occur in late 2004 (NATO, 
2000)158 
Greece belongs to all the above organizations and participates in all the processes 
regarding NATO’s transformation. Greece believes that the NATO restructuring and new 
enlargement to include southern Europe countries will enhance its capabilities and role as 
the only reliable political and military organization able to sustain peace in the Balkans as 
well as in Europe. According to the establishment of new NATO headquarters and 
regional commands, on May 1999, Greek Minister of Defense Akis Tsozatzopoulos, 
inaugurated the Greek sub-regional NATO headquarter in the city of Larissa in central 
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Greece (MACEDONIAN PRESS, 1999).159 Furthermore, the Greek defense diplomacy 
thought NATO should focus on the following actions: 
• Participation in the activities, exercises, and the decision-making 
mechanisms of the Alliance 
• Support for NATO’s evolution to a "common security" organization, as 
well as its enlargement 
• Support for the establishment of NATO headquarters on Greek territory, 
in connection with the various NATO decisions concerning the 
development of a new NATO command structure (G.E., 2000)160 
Developments of the last decade in the Balkans demonstrated the need for a more 
focused approach to the region. Greece strongly supports the open door dimension of 
Alliance cooperation with Partners that can assist the candidate countries in joining the 
NATO alliance. For that reason, Greece will continue to contribute to the efforts of these 
countries to establish and achieve the necessary criteria to achieve the overall goals of the 
Membership Action Plan in order to fully join NATO.  
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VI. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Kosovo conflict affected the Balkan countries in forms of emerging 
relationships among important stakeholders, e.g., Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the European Union 
(EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a Balkan country, Greece 
was affected by the evolving situation, which was reflected in its policy for security and 
stability in the Balkans. A survey was conducted to obtain additional insights for 
answering the following research questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
• How the Kosovo conflict affected the relationships among relevant 
regional stakeholders and what are the implications for Greece. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What were the critical factors leading up to the Kosovo conflict? 
• What were the actions of the international community to solve the Kosovo 
conflict? 
• What is the present status in Kosovo? 
• Who are the major stakeholders emerging from the Kosovo conflict? 
• What are the relationships among regional potential stakeholders and 
Greece’s stability foreign policy for security? 
Survey data was used to help assess the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in 
Greece as well as Greece’s redesigned post-Kosovo foreign stability policy for security in 
the Balkans presented in previous chapters. This chapter presents survey data and an 
analysis of the data collected. A description of the methodology used to conduct the 
survey is presented in the beginning. The survey was used for descriptive, explanatory 
and exploratory purposes to analyze the perceptions of 35 Greek officers attending the 
Naval Postgraduate School in March 2002.  Although a relatively small sample was used, 
significant findings were realized about consequences of the Kosovo conflict and 




B. METHODOLOGY  
A researcher developed, Likert scaled instrument was administered to 35 
participants. Twelve survey questions were grouped into two main categories to assess 
different aspects of the topic. The first six questions referred specifically to the Kosovo 
conflict from March to June of 1999 and the remaining six questions concerned Greek 
policy. Questions one through six were close-ended questions asking respondents to 
choose from a fixed set of response alternatives on a numerical Likert scale. Questions 
seven through twelve were close-ended and open-ended, asking respondents to choose 
from a fixed set of response alternatives, and to answer in their own words. At the 
beginning of the survey, two demographic items provided descriptive information about 
the respondent’s branch of the Greek military (Army, Navy, Air Force) and years on 
active duty. Complete anonymity was promised and for this reason no names have been 
used in this study. A total of 35 Greek officers from all branches of the military agreed to 
willingly and without retribution provide their candid responses for this study. 
Specifically, there were five Greek Army officers, 23 Greek Navy officers, and seven Air 
Force officers. All of them are at the graduate educational level with an average of 12 
years of military experience. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which 
they agreed or disagreed with the statements provided. Each selected the most 
appropriate response based on a five-level Likert Rating Scale to specify how strongly 
they felt positively or negatively on an issue. In this survey, the ‘No Opinion’ point was 
used as a midpoint. Therefore, responses were analyzed in terms of significant (dis) 
agreement with a proposed statement using a Chi-square (χ2) test for statistical 
significance. The purpose of the Chi-square test was to determine if the responses to each 
question were random or perhaps systematic (non-random). The number of categorical 
cells was grouped into ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ options. The ‘no opinion’ cell was not taken 
into account in the Chi-square calculation formula. The Chi-square test was applied to the 
case where the degree of freedom was one (df = number of cells – 1). The examined Chi-
square reflects Goodness of Fit. An analytical expression is given in Appendix A. The 
critical value from the Chi-square distribution obtained with one degree of freedom using 
.05 level of significance is 3.84. Thus, when the calculated value of Chi-square is equal to 
or greater than the critical value 3.84, the probability that the responses did not occur 
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randomly is at least 95 percent or the probability that the responses were random is five 
percent or less.  
Greece was affected by the Kosovo conflict and the new situation in the Balkans. 
Therefore, its foreign policy was reevaluated. Chapter V referred to the relations Greece 
has established with the five major stakeholders: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the European Union 
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The survey was intended to 
focus on those relations affected by the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in order to 
ascertain some conclusions and recommendations on the Greek foreign stability policy 
for security in the Balkans. The 35 Greek officers attending the Naval Postgraduate 
School comprise a purposive sample. Although not necessarily reflective of the overall 
Greek population, the sample may reflect relatively common, Greek citizen perceptions. 
C. SURVEY DATA OF GREEK OFFICERS 
The survey responses of the 35 Greek officers were evaluated using Greece’s 
foreign stability policy for security and then analyzed statistically using the mean values, 
standard deviations, max, min, mode and Chi-square.  The survey questionnaire data, as 
well as the data analysis, is presented in Appendix A.  
1. Questions Referring to the Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict in 
Greece  
The first category of questions one through six referred to some specific trends of 
the Kosovo conflict as reflected on Greek society and the economy.  These questions 
were developed to validate the findings of the archival research that the Kosovo conflict 
influenced some specific Greek interests. The variables examined in these questions were 
Greek citizens, the migration of refugees into Greece, cross-border crime, environmental 
contamination, combat readiness, and the Greek economy as it relates to migration.  
• Question 1: The Kosovo conflict substantially disturbed many Greek 
citizens 
Results indicate that the responses to the first question are significant (χ2 value 
greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05). This indicates that the responses from the Greek officers 
in the first question are not random. The Greek officers significantly perceived that the 
Kosovo conflict substantially disturbed many Greek citizens. Results for question 1 are 
presented in Table 4.   
71 
 











1 4.11 3 30 Agree 25.03 Yes 
 
Table 4. Question 1 Results. 
 
• Question 2: The Kosovo conflict substantially increased the migration 
of refugees into Greece 
Results were significant about whether or not the migration of refugees increased 
into Greece. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceive the migration of refugees 
substantially increased into Greece (χ2 value greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05). Results for 
question 2 are presented in Table 5. 
 











2 3.71 7 27 Agree 18.05 Yes 
            
Table 5. Question 2 Results. 
 
• Question 3: The Kosovo conflict substantially increased cross-border 
crime in Greece 
Analysis of the survey question on the cross-border crime yielded significant 
results (χ2 value greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05) and indicated that Greek officers perceive 
that cross-border crime substantially increased in Greece due to the Kosovo conflict. 
Results for question 3 are presented in Table 6. 
 











3 3.62 7 24 Agree 15.05 Yes 
          





• Question 4: The Kosovo conflict generated considerable 
environmental contamination, e.g., depleted uranium 
Analysis of the survey question on environmental contamination, e.g., depleted 
uranium, yielded significant results (χ2 value greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05) indicating 
that Greek officers perceive considerable environmental contamination did occur due to 
the Kosovo conflict. Results for question 4 are presented in Table 7. 
 











4    3.57 5 20 Agree 13.06 Yes 
 
Table 7. Question 4 Results. 
 
• Question 5: The Kosovo conflict substantially improved overall 
combat readiness of Greek Armed Forces 
Results indicate that the responses to this question were significant (χ2 value 
greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05).  The Greek officers perceived that the overall combat 
readiness of Greek Armed Forces did not improve substantially based on the Kosovo 
conflict. Results for question 5 are presented in Table 8.  
 











5 2.82 19 12 Disagree 5.14 Yes 
      
Table 8. Question 5 Results. 
 
• Question 6: The refugee migration hurt the Greek economy 
Analysis of the question on the migration consequences on the Greek economy 
did not yield significant results. Results indicate that perceptions vary as to whether the 
















6 2.94 15 13 Disagree 0.5 No 
 
Table 9. Question 6 Results. 
 
2. Questions Referring to the Greek Stability Policy for Security 
The second category of questions seven through twelve referred to some changes 
in Greece’s political imperatives on international perceptions and external policies due to 
the recent year of unrest in the Balkans and due to the Kosovo conflict. These questions 
were developed to assess the findings of the archival research for the new trends in the 
Greek foreign stability policy for security. The variables examined in these questions 
were the efforts of the Greek policy makers to decrease the migration of refugees to 
Greece, the result of long-term peace in Kosovo, Greece’s enhanced role in organizations 
such as the European Union (EU) and NATO, Greece’s role as a liaison and mediator in 
the EU and NATO, Greece’s enhanced position and power because of its liaison and 
mediator role, and the effect of private sector investment in Greek foreign affairs. 
• Question 7: Greece policy makers must substantially increase efforts 
to diminish migration of refugees into Greece 
Results indicate that the responses to this question were significant (χ2 value 
greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05).  The Greek officers perceive that Greek policy makers 
must substantially increase efforts to decrease the migration of refugees into Greece. 
Results for the seventh question are presented in Table 10.  
 











7 3.91 4 26 Agree 20.4 Yes 
 
Table 10. Question 7 Results. 
 
Comments to this question are listed below. Comments were edited for 
presentation purposes only. 
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 Agree Comments: 
Migration should be controlled to the level that the Greek economy can 
accommodate. Illegal immigrants should be identified and either deported 
or given a green card. Illegal immigrant presence leads to unsubstantial 
means and therefore criminal action. 
Greece cannot afford too many refugees at economical and social levels.  
It is necessary for Greece policy makers to diminish migration of refugees 
into Greece, because of minority issues and crime increase.  
There are already too many foreign immigrants in Greece and this 
situation has caused a lot of problems.   
Greece is a small country and cannot economically support all these 
people; unemployment rate is high so the only thing we take is the rise of 
crime.  
With the migration of refugees the unemployment and crime are 
increasing.  
Migration of refugees increases unemployment and decreases the number 
of jobs for Greek citizens.  
Greece’s first priority is economy and uncontrolled migration will 
eventually pose threats.  
Greece was unprepared for the amount of refugees that crossed borders 
last decade. Greece cannot absorb more refugees for the moment. 
Problems with the Albanian minority are already enough. Unemployment 
is also too high to be increased more.  
Refugees are a source of problems generally.  
 
Disagree Comments: 
I strongly disagree for humanitarian reasons. Where can they go? Greeks 




• Question 8: The current approach of combining military and political 
structures (KFOR, UNMIK) will likely result in long-term peace in 
Kosovo 
Analysis of the survey question on combining the military and political structure 
for long-term peace in Kosovo did not yield significant results. Comments indicate that 
the Greek officers varied in their perceptions about whether the political structure 
UNMIK and the military structure KFOR will result in long-term peace for Kosovo.  
Results for question 8 are presented in Table 11. 
 











8 2.88 14 13 Disagree 0.00 No 
 
Table 11. Question 8 Results. 
 
Comments to this question are listed below. 
 
Agree Comments: 
War actions will be prevented.  
It is probably the only way to maintain peace in and area characterized so 
many differences (ethnical, religious, historical etc) among local 
population.  
I believe KFOR and UNMIK are the only organizations, which can 
guarantee peace and impartiality.  
I believe these organizations will result in long-term peace in Kosovo as 
far as the hate between the people living at these areas will be eliminated.  
 
No opinion Comments: 
It is one of the factors that may contribute to establishing peace but not the 
only one.  
I think that the ethnic differences at this area are very deep. Sooner or later 
the volcano will erupt again.  
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 Disagree Comments: 
KFOR and UNMIK will not affect the will of the people.  
The local population is not feeling comfortable with the foreign military 
presence.  
There is no way to long-term peace without democratic reforms, stable 
government, economic rehabilitation, and ethic reconciliation.  
Kosovo belongs to its people. I believe that finally a political solution will 
give this land back to its people.  
Peace is never achieved through military force or political resolutions. 
They might impose peace for a finite period of time, but will not solve the 
problems.  
A long lasting solution in Kosovo can be found only after peaceful 
negotiations between the ethnic groups.  
These organizations presence does not solving any problems; just covers 
differences, which may guide to unpredictable situations.  
KFOR and UNMIK seem to be incapable of solving the problem.  
• Question 9: Greece (politicians and military) should play a more 
active role with the EU and NATO to enforce peace and stability in 
the East Balkans 
Results were significant concerning whether or not the Greek politicians and 
Greek military leaders should play a more active role in the EU and NATO to enforce 
peace and stability in the East Balkans. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceive 
Greece, both the politicians and military, should play a more active role (χ2 value greater 
than 3.84 and p<=. 05). Results for question 9 are presented in Table 12. 
 











9 4.51 1 33 Agree 30.03 Yes 
            
Table 12. Question 9 Results. 
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Comments to this question are listed below. 
 
Agree Comments:  
Yes because peace and stability in Balkans implies more stability and 
fewer dangers for Greece too.  
The Balkans is in the Greek ‘region of interest’ and therefore Greece 
should be able to pull the strings in the area and establish a leading role.  
Greece is the best candidate for this, because of its stability, economy, and 
culture. Good relations with Balkan countries.  
Greece is the only Balkan country that is member of both EU and NATO  
The strategic interests of Greece will be served better only if Greece is 
part of the process.  
Poverty and ethnic hatred in neighboring countries could result in unstable 
regimes whose collapse could hamper the Greek society.  
Greece should try to establish herself as the dominant Balkan Power and 
stability factor.  
Greece is geographically part of the Balkans and of course would like 
peace and stability in this area.  
Greece is the closest NATO country in the East Balkans and instability in 
this area influences us too.  
Because of its geographical position, Greece should be concerned more 
than everyone else in establishing peace and stability in the area.  
Greece must be the lighthouse in the Balkans as the only EU and NATO 
member in the area and to promote their values.  
We (Greeks) are the only Balkan nation being both a NATO and EU 
member. It is out duty to present the problems of this area to these two 
organizations.  
• Question 10: Greece should perform a more substantial liaison and 
mediator role between EU/NATO and Balkans 
Results were significant concerning whether or not Greece should play a more 
substantial liaison and mediator role between the EU/NATO and the Balkans. Results 
indicate that the Greek officers perceive Greece should perform a more substantial liaison 
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and mediator role (χ2 value greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05). Results for question 10 are 
presented in Table 13. 
 











10 4.48 1 32 Agree 29.03 Yes 
            
Table 13. Question 10 Results. 
 
Comments to this question are listed below. 
 
Agree Comments: 
To establish a most secure peace in the area. Greece is in a crucial area 
and has many interests in the Balkans.  
Cultural ties and mutual understanding provide for better trust of Greeks 
compared to others.  
Greece is the only Balkan country that is member of both EU and NATO.  
The way Greece can boost its strategic interests in the area like stability, 
prosperity, and respect of the status qvo of the borders.  
This procedure is a good way to control things or influence the other 
partners of EU/NATO and Balkans.  
I strongly agree, due to the fact that only Greece at this moment is in the 
position to keep stability in Balkans.  
Because Greece is the only Balkan country which is a member of these 
organizations and is aware of he particular problems and the whole 
situation ole than the other members of EU/NATO.  
This would substantially increase Greece’s prestige and influence among 
the Balkan nations.  
The only way to stay out of the problem is to be mediator. There is no 
need to support any of both sides acting this way.  
79 
I agree, because Greece as a Balkan country knows the problems well and 
the other countries in the Balkans fell more comfortable with Greece as a 
mediator.  
 
Disagree Comments:  
Greece should not try to promote the ideas and solutions of the EU/NATO 
in the Balkans, but rather those solutions that support Greek interests. 
These interests are not always in agreement with the EU and they are in 
total disagreement with the NATO.  
• Question 11: Increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement will 
enhance Greece’s overall position and power in EU/NATO 
Results were significant concerning whether or not increased Greek liaison and 
mediator involvement will enhance Greece’s overall position and power in the 
EU/NATO. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceived that Greece will enhance its 
overall position and power (χ2 value greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05). Results for question 
11 are presented in Table 14. 
 











11 4.14 3 29 Agree 24.03 Yes 
            
Table 14. Question 11 Results. 
 
Comments to this question are listed below. 
 
Agree Comments:  
It will prove once again the steady position of Greece to these 
organizations.  
An active member is a valuable member.  
The rest of the allies will depend more on Greece in the Balkans.  
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Greece will become the credible partner for Balkan issues whose opinion 
would be needed by both NATO/EU and Balkan regional problems.  
The stronger you get involved the better you seem to be as a strong and 
powerful country.  
Make Greece look stronger among other countries.  
Because in this way Greece will show in practice that tries for peace at this 
area and Greece’s allies can count on Greece.  
Greece will become a more important member of these organizations by 
proving capabilities of undertaking a so significant role.  
A successful mediator will present Greece as a strong and reliable partner 
in EU/NATO.  
It will prove that Greece is a useful ally, capable of undertaking any 
project.  
 
Disagree Comments:  
Only if Balkan countries ask for Greece’s mediator involvement and the 
Western EU/ NATO countries accept that. Otherwise Greece doesn’t have 
the power.  
Greek interests are not in agreement with EU/NATO.  
The overall position has nothing to do with how much you involve but 
with how strong you are.  
• Question 12: Continued and increased Greek private sector 
investment in Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) will substantially improve relations between Greece and 
these countries 
Results were significant concerning whether or not continued and increased 
investment by the Greek private sector in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) will substantially improve relations between Greece and these 
countries. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceived that investment by the Greek 
private sector will improve relations between Greece and Albania as well as between 
Greece and FYROM (χ2 value greater than 3.84 and p<=. 05). Results for question 12 are 















12 4.11 3 29 Agree 24.03 Yes 
            
Table 15. Question 12 Results. 
 
Comments to this question are listed below. 
 
Agree Comments: 
In some cases will be an improvement. But there are other issues, like the 
Greek minority that may cause tense between the two countries (or the 
Albanians in Greece).  
Because through economical relations will be increased the contact 
between populations.  
Business and money can be a powerful link.  
Boost economic prosperity and growth; improve stability, therefore the 
relations between the states.  
Diminishing poverty and providing for economic growth in these 
countries will have and effect similar to the U.S. in Europe after World 
War II.  
Every investment improves the way of life (direct or indirect) of citizens 
of these countries so the between us relationship will be enhanced.  
Common economical gains are achieved.  
Economic control of those countries by Greek companies is the backbone 
of the general relations that Greece will have.  
In that way these countries will need more and more the help of Greece, in 
order to improve their economy, which will result the total improvement 
of relations between them and Greece.  
Controlling the economy of any nation is equivalent to controlling the 
nation itself.  
The economical interests will reduce the political differences.  
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Financial activities of course bring people together, but sometimes 
ambitions politicians with ethnic pursuits, do not hesitate to destroy 
financial prosperity in order to achieve their goals.  
 
Disagree Comments: 
It will improve relations between Greek investors and those countries, not 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research examined the Kosovo problem with particular emphasis on how the 
Kosovo conflict affected relationships among relevant regional stakeholders, including 
implications for Greece. The study examined the historical and social background of the 
Balkans, the revival of nationalist pursuits in the area, the military intervention from 
NATO forces, and the current status in Kosovo and the Balkans. Greece was affected by 
the unrest and is concerned with improving regional security and stability. 
Greece’s post-Kosovo conflict foreign policy for stability in the Balkans was 
framed using a stakeholder analysis approach. Greece’s relationship with major regional 
stakeholders was derived. Additionally, direct and indirect consequences of the Kosovo 
conflict were analyzed using a researcher developed Questionnaire administered to 35 
Greek officers (Army, Navy, Air Force) attending the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA.   
This chapter draws conclusions based on the above mentioned data sources, plus 
analysis of applicable literature on the topic. Although the number of surveyed Greek 
officers is relatively small, their responses provide a relevant and interesting snapshot 
concerning the topic. Each participant Greek officer was assumed to represent  common 
Greek citizens with an average or above average  level of knowledge of the Balkans 
Kosovo conflict. The promise of complete anonymity hopefully yielded honest and open 
responses.  This chapter concludes by providing some policy recommendations. 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
1. Conclusions Based on Survey Results (p<=.05) 
The Kosovo Conflict may have substantially disturbed many Greek citizens. 
Migration of refugees into Greece due to the Kosovo Conflict may have been 
of substantial concern to the Greek public. 
The Kosovo Conflict may have raised cross-border crime into in Greece. 
Environmental contamination from the Kosovo Conflict (e.g., depleted 
uranium) may be a matter of considerable concern to the Greek public. 
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The Kosovo Conflict may not have improved confidence in the overall 
combat readiness of Greek Armed Forces within the command Forces themselves. 
Greece policy makers may substantially increase efforts to diminish 
migration of refugees into Greece. 
Greece (politicians and military) should play a more active role with the EU 
and NATO to enforce peace and stability in the East Balkans.  
Greece should perform a more substantial liaison and mediator role between 
EU/NATO and Balkans.  
Increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement may enhance Greece’s 
overall position and power in EU/NATO.      
Continued and increased Greek private sector investment in Albania and 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) may substantially improve 
relations between Greece and these countries.                  
2. Additional Conclusions 
• Post Cold-War international focus has shifted from a East-West, 
Central –Europe domain, to a European perimeter, Balkan domain 
The collapse of the communist regimes and the end of the Cold War were events 
that impacted European actual and perceived security. Dormant rivalries were awakened. 
The Balkans primarily, the Southeastern part, faced drastic political transitions, severe 
economic problems, and ethnic crisis among several national minorities. The historical 
confrontation between East and West appeared to migrate to the European periphery 
known as the Balkans. This Post Cold-War shift towards the Balkans is creating 
emerging new relationships among an array of Nation-States, NATO, and European 
Union stakeholders. 
• Although the Balkans and Kosovo conflicts may appear new to some, 
the roots of many disputes are three and four hundred years old 
Origins of these disputes can be traced to the following factors:  the ethnicity of 
the minorities; different religions; different cultures; and a history of economic and social 
problems. These factors influenced the Kosovo conflict, mostly in terms of nationalistic 
claims of Kosovar Albanians. NATO, the European Union and the United Nations were 
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major institutions contributing to the evolution of events in the Balkan region after the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia.  NATO carried out all the air strike missions with or 
without allied assistance. This intervention in Kosovo appeared to positively enhance 
NATO’s role as the world’s crisis manager. NATO’s presence remained in Kosovo after 
the end of the air strikes as the Kosovo Force (KFOR).  
The European Union undertook to implement a common foreign and security 
policy. The initiation of the Stability Pact attempts to substitute an old, reactive crisis 
intervention policy in Southeastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict 
prevention strategy. The United Nations also played a critical role in the Balkans. The 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 formalized the peace in Kosovo. This 
resulted in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
declaring permanent peace and a solution to the Kosovo conflict. 
Restoring full political order in Kosovo is obviously a major challenge. The 
KFOR and UNMIK administrations have managed to maintain relative peace in Kosovo. 
There are many remaining challenges for normality and stability to be established in 
Kosovo. The goal of creating and maintaining an environment of safety and peace in the 
Balkan area is the first priority of these multinational administrations.  
• There are still issues which threaten Kosovo regional stability 
The Kosovo conflict revealed persistent problems in the Balkan region: economic 
underdevelopment; aggressive ethnic minorities; refugees flow and illegal immigration; 
cross-border crime; lack of democratic institutions; and environmental contamination. 
These problems create challenges for stakeholders inside and outside the immediate 
Balkan region. A common Balkan and European approach, with NATO support, is likely 
the only framework whereby these complex and messy issues can be resolved over many 
years. 
• Greece’s role in the region is expanding in terms of a communication 
crossroads and regional peace-maker 
Greece is often depicted as being at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa. 
This geopolitical, continent-linking position catapults Greece into the role of strategic 
bridge and regional peace-maker. Greece is the only Balkan country that is a member of 
the European Union and NATO. It is also a member of the United Nations (UN), the 
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European 
Union (WEU). Greece’s geopolitical importance as well as its membership in the 
European Union and NATO organizations depicts Greece’s opportunity to play an 
increasing strategic role in the region.  Greece is successfully contributing to an emerging 
European Balkan policy.  Greece supports the establishment of good relations among all 
Balkan countries through the following: internationally recognized principles of the 
inviolability of borders, full respect for the human rights of ethnic communities, the 
peaceful resolution of differences; involvement in the Balkan infrastructure, cooperation 
and defense; and participation in international missions. 
• Greece facilitates good relationships with its neighbor countries and 
assists them by providing humanitarian assistance; economic 
assistance; and contributing to the efforts of candidate countries to 
establish and achieve the necessary criteria to join international 
organizations 
Regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, and FYROM, Greece 
contributes in the economic sector with investment and commercial activities, and 
political and economic initiatives. Greece becomes a bridge between the security in the 
Balkans and Europe. Greece can also help its neighbor countries to prepare for European 
integration. The process for a Balkan country to join the European Union membership is 
difficult because it requires a certain economic and political level  for accession. The 
Balkan countries need European assistance to reach that level. The same level of 
difficulty is included in the process for a country to join the NATO membership as a full 
member. Greece can assist a Balkan country towards achieving full NATO membership. 
Greece provides this assistance based on the principles of respect of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Balkan stability and security are vital for European security. Europe 
realized that security could be sustained only if there is peace in the Balkan region.  This 
is designated with the initiation of the Stability Pact. Greece realized that Balkan peace is 
related to the stability and security in the Balkan region. Greece’s relationships with the 
Balkan countries is not only from a bilateral perspective, but is also aligned with the 
European Union and NATO mandates and policies aimed towards long-term cooperation. 
Greece’s geopolitical position, its relations with the Balkan countries, the cooperation 
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within the sector of international organizations, and its political will for peace constitutes 
a source of stability in South-Eastern Europe. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS: AN UNOFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE 
• The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
efforts should focus on a long-term solution to Kosovo 
The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) plays a 
significant role in settling peace in Kosovo by performing all the principal administrative 
functions such as law and order, health, mail, and education. Now that peace is restored 
the next step is the Kosovo’s status. The conflict in Kosovo showed that finding a stable 
and lasting settlement might be difficult. The Kosovo status is better to be seen within a 
‘Total Balkan Approach’, a regional approach to democracy, security, and prosperity 
(MOA, 2002).161 Kosovo could exist with substantial autonomy, but within the borders 
of Yugoslavia, with respect of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and respect for the 
region’s minorities. Balkan countries in cooperation with the international community 
must collaborate and find alternatives to solve all the Balkan ethnic disputes including 
Kosovo.  Negotiations among the Balkan countries can strengthen civil society, improve 
conditions for economic development and enhance prospects for integration in the 
European Union and NATO. With respect for local and international interests, this 
collaboration will stop ethnic minority conflicts and will give the opportunity for peace to 
last in the region.  
• The European Union should support inclusion of southeastern Europe 
Balkan countries into the EU 
The Kosovo conflict demonstrated the need for the Balkan countries to participate 
in the European Union. The Cold War consequences on Europe and specifically in the 
Balkans can be overcome only when politically and economically unstable areas join 
cohesive international organizations such as the European Union. The economic and 
military peacekeeping EU assistance to Kosovo as well as the Stability Pact initiation 
determined the European Union leading role in the Balkan region. European Union 
enlargement into the Balkan countries must be within an expandable process. This 
                                                 
161 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Total Balkan Approach. Available online at, 
http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/SouthEast Europe/TotalBalkanApproach.stm. 
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process must consider the prerequisites criteria needed for integration, as well as the 
urgent need for the southeastern Balkan countries of EU integration. 
• The European Council through its Committee on the Environment, 
Regional Planning and Local Authorities should strengthen 
international rules on environmental protection in cases of military 
actions 
The environmental impact of the Kosovo conflict crossed over the boundaries of 
Yugoslavia.  Environmental consequences occurred in adjacent areas on neighboring 
countries. Water and air contamination from ordnance used by the NATO military forces 
(depleted uranium) have impacted the health of the population of the area as well as 
transboundary consequences. Depleted uranium is likely to increase cancer among the 
people of the affected areas. Furthermore this danger is applied to the humanitarian 
assistance forces in Kosovo. The Rio Declaration on Environment of 1992 and other 
United Nations resolutions should be reaffirmed by the European environmental 
committee to strength its environmental policy in Europe. Furthermore the evaluation of 
damage and environmental rehabilitation should be prioritized in the post-Kosovo 
conflict Balkans reconstruction agenda.        
• NATO should continue reforming its strategic goals, structures, and 
functions and should consider a next round of enlargement to include 
southeastern Balkan countries 
As reaffirmed on 24 April 1999 in the 50th anniversary of the creation of NATO, 
it is facing the challenges of the post-Cold War era. A substantial change must be 
sustained in order for the Euro Atlantic alliance to transform from a purely deterrent 
military organization, to a security organization with parallel political, diplomatic and 
military character. The primary mission will be the preservation of peace. Today the 
primary threat comes from ethnic, economical, social, and environmental tensions that 
create instability in the regions. Furthermore, NATO must be prepared to prevent and 
manage organized violence emerging from extremist actions, ethnic minority disputes, 
religious fundamentalism, cross-border crime, drug trafficking, mass refugee movements, 
and environmental threats (MOD, 2000)162.  NATO in its first round of enlargement 
welcomed the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The Kosovo conflict increased the 
number of countries wanting to join the NATO alliance. NATO should consider a second 
                                                 
162 Greek Ministry of Defence. Leyki Biblos Gia Tis Enoples Dynameis. 1998-1999, p. 15. 
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round of enlargement to include countries of southeastern Europe to further stabilize the 
region, e.g., Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and FYROM. The alliance should 
assist these countries to achieve the prerequisite economic and political qualifications for 
their inclusion in NATO.  
• Greece should continue to support the establishment of good 
neighborly relations and the development of close economic ties 
among all Balkan countries in order to promote its stabilization policy 
The unrest in the Balkans has made a great impact on Greece and on Europe in 
general. The emerged new states, the ethnic minorities, and the disputes of the borders 
are the main elements of this impact. These characteristic elements challenge the security 
in Europe, which has appeared as the dominant political issue in the region. The security 
issue includes military concerns, human rights protection, democratic principles, and 
economic development. This term of security can only be guaranteed with stability in the 
region. Greece, as the only country in southeastern Europe which belongs to the 
European Union and NATO, and as the regions European model for economic and 
democratic reforms, supports the establishment of good neighborly relations and the 
integration of these countries into EU and NATO. An integration of these neighbor 
countries of southeastern Europe in these organizations could greatly contribute to the 
stability, economic prosperity and peace in Europe. The relationship of the Balkans with 
the EU and NATO will be influential in the creation of an internal Balkan cooperation. 
Otherwise there is high likelihood of further destabilization in the region. Greece’s 
stability policy for security should be established on the principles of the territorial 
integrity of countries, the inviolability of borders, respect of human and minority rights, 
and the peaceful resolution of differences.     
• Greece should legalize the Albanian illegal immigrants to integrate 
foreign workers into Greek society and enforce the law for the illegal 
immigrants who are engaged in criminal activities 
Greece has hosted a large amount of immigrants. These low-wage workers have a 
positive impact on the Greek economy, particularly in construction, tourism, and 
housework. These immigrants also bolster the Albanian economy with their remittances. 
It is in the mutual interest of both Greece and Albania for Albanian immigrants to work 
legally in Greece. Greece should legalize the immigrants who have proof of employment. 
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This will help to ensure that Albanian immigrants are actively involved in Greek society, 
and receive full access to social services (MOF, 1999)163. The illegal immigrants 
involved in criminal activities should be detained and deported. Such a process will be 
under the respect of human rights. Furthermore cooperation between Greece and Albania 
will provide alternatives for the problem of illegal immigration and organized crime. 
Approachable ways of legalizing illegal immigrants will benefit both countries and will 
diminish the illegal immigrants crime activities. Also it would be a leverage for the Greek 
minority in Albania and its treatment. 
• Greece should continue to improve its economic diplomacy in the 
Balkan region  to implement its foreign stability policy for security 
Greece places special emphasis on economic diplomacy as a means for 
strengthening economic, cultural ties, and understanding between itself and its neighbors. 
The Greek government should continue to encourage private foreign investment as a 
matter of foreign policy. Today Greek investment and trade exchanges with Greece’s 
neighbors have increased. A special organization named Bilateral Economic Cooperation 
Bureau has been initiated since 1995 to facilitate the processes and procedures needed for 
a Greek company to activate its business in a foreign country. Greek investment is given 
special attention in the areas of energy, telecommunications, transport, construction, and 
shipping.  Investment is a means of collaboration between the countries. Balkan countries 
having moved politically from confrontation to cooperation, providing for themselves 
increased economic opportunities. Investment is the main factor to improve relationships 
and enhance stability. It is common knowledge that a strong foreign policy relies on a 
strong economy. Good relations with other nations pass through private investment 
initiatives as well as economic cooperation that is mutually beneficial to the countries and 
individuals involved. According to Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, one of 
the keys to stability and success is investment (TRIBUNE, 2000)164 
 
 
                                                 
163 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. George Papandreou Meets Albanian Counterpart Pascal Milo. 
Available online at, http://www.papandreou.gr/july99/gpapmilo9799English.html. 
164 World Tribune. Will Foreign Investments Bring Peace to the Balkans? Available online at, 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/Archive-2000/mz05-10.html. 
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APPENDIX A.  SURVEY  
A. CHI-SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE 
A researcher developed, Likert scaled instrument was administered to 35 
participants. Twelve survey questions were grouped into two main categories to assess 
different aspects of the topic. The first six questions referred specifically to the Kosovo 
conflict from March to June of 1999 and the remaining six questions concerned Greek 
policy. Questions one through six were close-ended questions, asking respondents to 
choose from a fixed set of response alternatives (numerical Likert scale). Questions seven 
through twelve were close-ended and open-ended, asking respondents to choose from a 
fixed set of response alternatives, and to answer in their own words. At the beginning of 
the survey, two demographic items provided descriptive information about the 
respondent’s branch of the Greek military (Army, Navy, Air Force) and years on active 
duty. Complete anonymity was promised and for this reason no names have been used in 
this study. A total of 35 Greek officers from all branches of the Greek military agreed to 
willingly and without retribution provide their candid responses for this study.  
Specifically, there were five Greek Army officers, 23 Navy officers, and seven Air Force 
officers. All of them are at the graduate educational level with an average of 12 years of 
military experience. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
or disagreed to the statements provided. Each selected the most appropriate response 
based on a five-level Likert Rating Scale to specify how strongly they felt positively or 
negatively on an issue. The Likert Rating Scale is presented below: 
1. Strongly Disagree (SA) 
2. Disagree (D) 
3. No Opinion (NO) 
4. Agree (A) 
5. Strongly Agree (SA) 
In this survey, the ‘No Opinion’ point was used as a midpoint. Therefore, 
responses were analyzed in terms of significant (dis)agreement with a proposed statement   
using a Chi-square (χ2) test for statistical significance. The purpose of the Chi-square test 
was to determine if the responses to each question were random or perhaps systematic 
(non-random). The number of categorical cells was grouped into ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ 
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options. The ‘no opinion’ cell was not taken into account in the Chi-square calculation 
formula. The Chi-square test was applied to the case where the Degree of Freedom was 
one (df = number of cells – 1). The examined Chi-square test reflects Goodness of Fit. 
The obtaining critical value from the Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom 
using .05 level of significance is 3.84. Thus, when the calculated value of Chi-square is 
equal to or greater than the critical value 3.84, the probability that the responses did not 
occur randomly is at least 95 percent or the probability that the responses were random is 
five percent or less. Figure A-1 shows the formula of the Goodness of Fit test. 
 
 
Χ2 =   (M-m-1)2                                        M = Majority 
             M+m                                            m = Minority 
 
  
Figure A-1. Goodness of Fit Test Formula. 
 
Table A-1 shows the critical values of Chi-square for Degrees of Freedom (df) = 
1. 
Degrees of 
Freedom .05 .025 .01 .005 .001 
1 3.84 5.02 6.63 7.88 10.83 
 
Table A-1. Chi-Square Critical values 
 
Figure A-2 shows a graphical representation of the Chi-square critical value with 































• WFigure A-2. Chi-Square Critical Value for 1df. 
 for the Chi-square test of significance procedure in this survey are:        
t Hypothesis: 
Ho: The two categorical variables are not significantly different 
(random) 
H1: The two categorical variables are significantly different (not 
random) 
hoose level of significance 
alculate test statistic: χ2  
etermine degrees of freedom: 1 
ompare test statistic with Table A-1 value  
ake decision 
>=3,84, p<=. 05 then reject the null hypothesis Ho and conclude that the 
questions were not random. 
ONS 
ey was conducted to obtain additional insights for answering the 
h questions: 
rimary Research Question 
ow the Kosovo conflict affected the relationships among relevant 
gional stakeholders and what are the implications for Greece. 
condary Research Questions 
hat were the critical factors leading up to the Kosovo conflict? 
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• What were the actions of the international community to solve the Kosovo 
conflict? 
•  
• What is the present status in Kosovo? 
• Who are the major stakeholders emerging from the Kosovo conflict? 
• What are the relationships among regional potential stakeholders and 
Greece’s stability foreign policy for security? 
Survey data was used to help assess the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in 
Greece as well as Greece’s redesigned post-Kosovo foreign stability policy for security in 
the Balkans presented in previous chapters. 
The survey was used for descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes to 
analyze the perceptions of 35 Greek officers attending at the Naval Postgraduate School 




The results of this questionnaire will be used to complete my thesis titled: “The 
Kosovo Conflict: Emerging Relationships and Implications for Greece”. Please complete 
the questionnaire by circling a response for each question. Space has been provided for 
your comments. Complete anonymity is promised. No names will be used in this study.  
Thank you for your valuable participation. 
 
Branch of Greek military                       Army O            Navy O           Air Force O 
 
 
 Years of active-duty service                 ________          ________         _________ 
  
 
Please respond to all the following statements. The first six questions refer specifically to 








Strongly              Disagree              No              Agree              Strongly 
Disagree                                       Opinion                                   Agree 
 
 
The Kosovo Conflict: 
 
SD       D        NO       A       SA        
1.  Substantially disturbed many Greek citizens. O        O         O         O        O   
 
 
2.  Substantially increased the migration of SD       D        NO       A       SA       
     refugees into Greece.  O         O         O         O        O      
  
 
3.  Substantially increased cross-border crime  SD       D        NO       A       SA       
     in Greece. O         O         O        O        O 
 
 
4.  Generated considerable environmental  SD       D        NO       A       SA       
     contamination, e.g., depleted uranium.   O        O         O         O        O 
 
 
5.  Substantially improved overall combat  SD       D        NO       A       SA   
     readiness of Greek Armed Forces. O        O         O          O        O 
 
 
SD       D        NO       A       SA        
6. The refugee migration hurt the Greek economy O       O         O         O        O   
 
 
7.  Greece policy makers must substantially increase  SD       D        NO       A       SA       
   efforts to diminish migration of refugees into Greece. O        O         O          O        O 
   Why / Why not? _______________________________ 
   _____________________________________________ 
   _____________________________________________ 
 
 
8. The current approach of combining military and 
     political structures (KFOR, UNMIK) will likely SD       D        NO       A       SA   
     result in long-term peace for Kosovo. O        O         O          O        O 
     Why / Why not? _____________________________ 
     ___________________________________________ 
     ___________________________________________ 





9. Greece (politicians and military) should play a more  
    active role with the EU and NATO to enforce peace SD       D        NO       A       SA   
    and stability in the East Balkans. O        O         O          O        O 
    Why / Why not? ______________________________  
     ___________________________________________ 
     ___________________________________________ 
          
                                                                          
 
 
10. Greece should perform a more substantial  
       liaison and mediator role between EU/NATO and SD       D        NO       A       SA   
       Balkans. O        O         O          O        O 
        Why / Why not? ____________________________ 
        __________________________________________ 
        __________________________________________ 
 
 
11. Increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement               
      will enhance Greece’s overall position and power SD       D        NO       A       SA   
      in EU/NATO. O        O         O          O        O 
       Why / Why not? _____________________________ 
       __________________________________________ 
       __________________________________________ 
 
 
12. Continued and increased Greek private sector  
       investment in Albania and Former Yugoslavic  
       Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will  
       substantially improve relations between  SD       D        NO       A       SA   
       Greece and these countries.  O        O         O          O        O 
        Why / Why not?____________________________ 
        _________________________________________ 
        _________________________________________ 
 
 
C. SURVEY DATA  
Table A-2 presents the survey data received from the responses of the thirty-five 
Greek officers to the twelve applied questions.  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 2
2 4 4 4 5 5 1 4 3 4 3 3 2
3 5 1 4 3 2 2 5 2 5 5 2 5
4 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 4 4 4 4 4
5 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 5 5 5
6 5 5 5 4 3 2 5 3 5 5 4 4
7 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 2 5 5 5 5
8 5 5 5 3 1 2 5 2 5 5 5 5
9 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4
10 4 4 2 1 1 3 1 4 5 5 4 4
11 5 4 4 5 2 3 5 2 5 5 5 5
12 4 4 4 5 2 4 4 2 5 4 2 4
13 3 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 4
14 2 5 5 3 2 4 2 3 5 5 5 4
15 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 5
16 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 5
17 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 5 5 5 4
18 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 4
19 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 2 4 4 4 4
20 5 5 5 4 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 5
21 5 4 3 5 2 4 3 2 5 4 5 5
22 4 2 2 4 2 2 5 4 5 5 5 5
23 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
24 5 3 3 4 1 4 5 1 5 2 2 5
25 2 4 4 2 4 2 4 1 5 5 4 4
26 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 3
27 3 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
28 5 5 4 3 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 3
29 4 5 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 5 4 5
30 4 4 4 4 2 2 5 2 5 5 5 2
31 4 4 4 2 2 5 5 4 5 5 4 5
32 5 2 2 4 2 2 4 3 5 5 3 4
33 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4
34 5 2 2 5 2 1 2 1 5 5 4 4
35 5 1 2 3 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4
Questions
Group 1 Group 2Survey
 
Table A-2. Survey Data. 
 
D. SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Table A-3 presents the results of the survey data analysis of the responses 




No Agree Chi p<=.05
Opinion Disagree Square Yes/No
1 4.11 0.87 2 5 4 3 30 2 Agree 25.03 Yes
2 3.71 1.12 1 5 4 7 27 1 Agree 18.05 Yes
3 3.62 0.97 2 5 4 7 24 4 Agree 15.05 Yes
4 3.57 1.00 1 5 4 5 20 10 Agree 13.06 Yes
5 2.82 1.22 1 5 2 19 12 4 Disagree 5.14 Yes
6 2.94 1.08 1 5 2 15 13 7 Disagree 0.5 No
7 3.91 1.03 1 5 4 4 26 5 Agree 20.04 Yes
8 2.88 1.02 1 4 4 14 13 8 Disagree 0.00 No
9 4.51 0.70 2 5 5 1 33 1 Agree 30.03 Yes
10 4.48 0.74 2 5 5 1 32 2 Agree 29.03 Yes
11 4.14 0.91 2 5 4 3 29 3 Agree 24.03 Yes
12 4.11 0.90 2 5 4 3 29 3 Agree 24.03 Yes
Max Mode Disagree AgreeQuestions Mean St.Dev. Min
 
Table A-3. Survey Data Analysis Results. 
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APPENDIX B.  RESOLUTION 1199 (1998) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998 
The Security Council,  
Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,  
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution, and in 
particular his report of 4 September 1998 (S/1998/834 and Add. 1),  
Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion 
of the Contact Group's meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan 
(S/1998/567, annex), and the further statement of the Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 
July 1998 (S/1998/657),  
Noting also with appreciation the joint statement by the Presidents of the Russian 
Federation and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 16 June 1998 (S/1998/526),  
Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the 
situation in Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the 
Tribunal,  
Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive 
and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which 
have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the 
Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,  
Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by the 
increasing numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees has estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities,  
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in 
safety, and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for 
creating the conditions which allow them to do so,  
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political 
goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, 
including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing 
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concern at the reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 
1160 (1998),  
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout 
Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of 
the Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,  
Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of 
international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all 
inhabitants of Kosovo are respected,  
Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed 
support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an 
enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful 
self-administration,  
Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,  
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease 
hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful dialogue 
between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian 
catastrophe;  
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the 
humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian 
catastrophe;  
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful 
dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and to 
a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated 
political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts 
aimed at facilitating such a dialogue;  
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to 
the measures called for under resolution 1160 (1998), implement 
immediately the following concrete measures towards achieving a political 
solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the Contact Group 
statement of 12 June 1998:  
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a. cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian 
population and order the withdrawal of security units used for 
civilian repression;  
b. enable effective and continuous international monitoring in 
Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and 
diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement 
of such monitors to, from and within Kosovo unimpeded by 
government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate 
travel documents to international personnel contributing to the 
monitoring;  
c. facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees 
and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and 
unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to 
Kosovo;  
d. make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to 
in paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in 
resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing confidence-
building measures and finding a political solution to the problems 
of Kosovo;  
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the 
Russian Federation of 16 June 1998:  
a. to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of 
equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo;  
b. not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful 
population;  
c. to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will 
be no restrictions on representatives of foreign States and 
international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;  
d. to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian 
organizations, the ICRC and the UNHCR, and delivery of 
humanitarian supplies;  
e. to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced 
persons under programmes agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, 
providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed homes,  
 
and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;  
 
6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, 
and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community 
should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;  
7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions 
imposed by resolution 1160 (1998);  
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8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of 
the situation in Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the 
establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission;  
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the 
responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous international 
monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of 
resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved;  
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary 
responsibility for the security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the safety and security of all 
international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate steps to ensure that monitoring 
personnel performing functions under this resolution are not subject to the 
threat or use of force or interference of any kind;  
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic 
legislation and relevant international law to prevent funds collected on 
their territory being used to contravene resolution 1160 (1998);  
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate 
resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond 
promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency 
Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo Crisis;  
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community and all others concerned to 
cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal;  
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to bring to justice those members of the security forces who 
have been involved in the mistreatment of civilians and the deliberate 
destruction of property;  
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council 
as necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolution by the 
authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all elements in the 
Kosovo Albanian community, including through his regular reports on 
compliance with resolution 1160 (1998);  
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and 
resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and 
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the 
region;  
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
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APPENDIX C.  MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT 
Between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia 
 
Article I: General Obligations  
1. The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm the document presented by President 
Ahtisaari to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the 
Federal Government on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under UN 
auspices of effective international civil and security presences. The Parties further 
note that the UN Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has 
been introduced, regarding these presences.  
2. The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force 
("KFOR") will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in 
paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority 
to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all 
citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to 
comply with all of the obligations of this Agreement and to facilitate the 
deployment and operation of this force.  
3. For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings 
as described below:  
a. "The Parties" are those signatories to the Agreement.  
b. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or 
organisation of the Parties.  
c. "FRY Forces" includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel 
and organisations with a military capability. This includes regular army 
and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, 
air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, 
intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or 
individuals so designated by the international security force ("KFOR") 
commander.  
d. The Air Safety Zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends 
beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It 
includes the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone.  
e. The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that 
extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. 
It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone.  
f. Entry into Force Day (EIF Day) is defined as the day this Agreement is 
signed.  
4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:  
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a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances 
shall any Forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, 
or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) 
and the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) described in paragraph 3. Article I without 
the prior express consent of the international security force ("KFOR") 
commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.  
 The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of FRY and 
Serbian personnel which will be the subject of a subsequent separate 
agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of this Article.  
b. To provide for the support and authorization of the international security 
force ("KFOR") and in particular to authorize the international security 
force ("KFOR") to take such actions as are required, including the use of 
necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection 
of the international security force ("KFOR"), and to contribute to a secure 
environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other 
international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations 
(details in Appendix B).  
 
Article II: Cessation of Hostilities  
1. The FRY Forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (EIF) of this 
Agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type 
against any person in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such 
activities. They shall not encourage, organise or support hostile or provocative 
demonstrations.  
2. Phased Withdrawal of FRY Forces (ground): The FRY agrees to a phased 
withdrawal of all FRY Forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. 
FRY Forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they 
withdraw, FRY Forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all 
mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles and charges. They will also mark all 
sides of all minefields. International security forces' ("KFOR") entry and 
deployment into Kosovo will be synchronized. The phased withdrawal of FRY 
Forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below:  
a. By EIF + 1 day, FRY Forces located in Zone 3 will have vacated, via 
designated routes, that Zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the 
map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Once it is verified that FRY forces 
have complied with this subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this Article, 
NATO air strikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue 
provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, 
and provided that the UNSC adopts a resolution concerning the 
deployment of the international security force ("KFOR") so rapidly that a 
security gap can be avoided.  
b. By EIF + 6 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 1 
(depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Establish liaison 
teams with the KFOR commander in Pristina.  
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c. By EIF + 9 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 2 
(depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).  
d. By EIF + 11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 3 
(depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).  
e. By EIF +11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have completed their 
withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on map at Appendix A to the 
Agreement) to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5 
km GSZ. At the end of the sequence (EIF + 11), the senior FRY Forces 
commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in 
writing to the international security force ("KFOR") commander that the 
FRY Forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. The 
international security force ("KFOR") commander may approve specific 
requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. The bombing campaign 
will terminate on complete withdrawal of FRY Forces as provided under 
Article II. The international security force ("KFOR") shall retain, as 
necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this Agreement.  
f. The authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia will co-operate 
fully with international security force ("KFOR") in its verification of the 
withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ.  
g. FRY armed forces withdrawing in accordance with Appendix A, i.e. in 
designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not 
be subject to air attack.  
h. The international security force ("KFOR") will provide appropriate control 
of the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM (1) until the 
arrival of the civilian mission of the UN.  
3. Phased Withdrawal of Yugoslavia Air and Air Defence Forces (YAADF)  
a. At EIF + 1 day, no FRY aircraft, fixed wing and rotary, will fly in Kosovo 
airspace or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international 
security force ("KFOR") commander. All air defence systems, radar, 
surface-to-air missile and aircraft of the Parties will refrain from 
acquisition, target tracking or otherwise illuminating international security 
("KFOR") air platforms operating in the Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ.  
b. By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including 
man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)) and anti-aircraft artillery 
in Kosovo will withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 
kilometre ASZ.  
c. The international security force ("KFOR") commander will control and 
coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF. 
Violation of any of the provisions above, including the international 
security force ("KFOR") commander's rules and procedures governing the 
airspace over Kosovo, as well as unauthorised flight or activation of FRY 
Integrated Air Defence (IADS) within the ASZ, are subject to military 
action by the international security force ("KFOR"), including the use of 
necessary force. The international security force ("KFOR") commander 
may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRY 
institutions to monitor operations, deconflict international security force 
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("KFOR") air traffic movements, and ensure smooth and safe operations 
of the air traffic system. It is envisioned that control of civil air traffic will 
be returned to civilian authorities as soon as practicable.  
 
Article III: Notifications  
1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately 
communicated to all FRY forces.  
2. By EIF +2 days, the State governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic 
of Serbia shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of 
all FRY Forces:  
a. Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded 
ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire 
entanglement, physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any 
personnel in Kosovo laid by FRY Forces.  
b. Any further information of a military or security nature about FRY Forces 
in the territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the 
international security force ("KFOR") commander.  
Article IV: Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)  
A JIC shall be established with the deployment of the international security force 
("KFOR") to Kosovo as directed by the international security force ("KFOR") 
commander.  
 
Article V: Final Authority to Interpret 
The international security force ("KFOR") commander is the final authority 
regarding interpretation of this Agreement and the security aspects of the peace 
settlement it supports. His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.  
6.  
Article VI: Entry Into Force  








B. International security force ("KFOR") operations  
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1. Consistent with the general obligations of the Military Technical Agreement, the 
State Governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia understand 
and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") will deploy and operate 
without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary 
action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.  
2. The international security force ("KFOR") commander shall have the authority, 
without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, 
including the use of military force, to protect the international security force 
("KFOR"), the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the 
responsibilities inherent in this Military Technical Agreement and the Peace 
Settlement which it supports.  
3. The international security force ("KFOR") nor any of its personnel or staff shall 
be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the 
course of duties related to the implementation of this Agreement. The parties will 
agree a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as soon as possible.  
4. The international security force ("KFOR") shall have the right:  
a. To monitor and ensure compliance with this Agreement and to respond 
promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if 
required.  
 
This includes necessary actions to:  
 
1. Enforce withdrawals of FRY forces.  
2. Enforce compliance following the return of selected FRY 
personnel to Kosovo  
3. Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the 
implementation or otherwise authorized by the UNSC.  
b. To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, and with 
FRY/Serbian civil and military authorities.  
c. To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in 
Kosovo that the international security force ("KFOR") commander 
believes has or may have military or police capability, or may be 
associated with the employment of military or police capabilities, or are 
otherwise relevant to compliance with this Agreement.  
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Parties understand 
and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") commander has the right 
and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific 
Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the 
international security force ("KFOR") commander determines a potential threat to 
either the international security force ("KFOR") or its mission, or to another 
Party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or 
potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the international 
security force ("KFOR") shall be subject to military action by the international 
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APPENDIX D.  RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999 
The Security Council, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, 
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 
1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, 
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these 
resolutions, 
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes, 
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts 
by any party, 
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing 
concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in 
safety, 
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 
6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the 
paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set 
out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, 
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful 
self-administration for Kosovo, 
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Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the 
implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and 
acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the 
general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles 
and other required elements in annex 2;  
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the 
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, 
and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
their rapid implementation;  
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an 
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and 
begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all 
military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, 
with which the deployment of the international security presence in 
Kosovo will be synchronized;  
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and 
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to 
perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;  
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of 
international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and 
personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;  
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the 
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation 
of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-
General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with 
the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate 
towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;  
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to 
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 
of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under 
paragraph 9 below;  
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international 
civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties 
cooperate fully in their deployment;  
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be 
deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:  
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary 
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing 
the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and 
paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;  
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b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other 
armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;  
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced 
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence 
can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and 
humanitarian aid can be delivered;  
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil 
presence can take responsibility for this task;  
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as 
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;  
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work 
of the international civil presence;  
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;  
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the 
international civil presence, and other international organizations;  
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to 
provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo 
can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing 
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;  
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will 
include:  
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 
and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);  
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 
required;  
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political 
settlement, including the holding of elections;  
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of 
Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;  
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future 
status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);  
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's 
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political 
settlement;  
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction;  
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid;  
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i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces 
and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel 
to serve in Kosovo;  
j. Protecting and promoting human rights;  
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes in Kosovo;  
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to 
ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;  
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to 
economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and 
displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an 
international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 
11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;  
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security 
presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;  
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end 
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for 
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in 
consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;  
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) 
shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil 
and security presences;  
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international 
organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development 
and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the 
implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad 
international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, 
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;  
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all 
aspects of this resolution;  
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an 
initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council 
decides otherwise;  
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 
implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the 
international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 
30 days of the adoption of this resolution;  









Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political 
solution to the Kosovo crisis: 
• Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;  
• Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;  
• Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security 
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;  
• Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by 
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;  
• The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and 
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;  
• A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for 
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization 
of the KLA;  
• Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization 
of the crisis region.  
 
Annex 2 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of 
the Kosovo crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.  
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 
according to a rapid timetable.  
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international 
civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.  
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control 
and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to 
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.  
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the 
international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by 
the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
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provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.  
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be 
permitted to return to perform the following functions:  
o Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security 
presence;  
o Marking/clearing minefields;  
o Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;  
o Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.  
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.  
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full 
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries 
of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties 
for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-
governing institutions.  
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-
Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further 
promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.  
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth 
above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, 
which are specified in the footnote below.(1) A military-technical agreement will 
then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional 
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in 
Kosovo:  
Withdrawal 
o Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and 
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be 
withdrawn;  
Returning personnel  
o Equipment associated with returning personnel;  
o Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;  
o Timetable for their return;  
o Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;  
o Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence 
and the international civil mission.  
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